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COMMUNISM'S CHALLENGE AND THE
CONSTITUTION*
MURRAY COHEN AND ROBERT F. FucHs
Introduction
A spectre is haunting America -"the spectre of communism,"' and
fear of it has precipitated a demand for prophylactic action. But any
restraint on those here who seek to make that spectre a reality can be
justified only if our democracy, which is committed to the protection of
wrong as well as right ideas, must act in self-defense.
The appeal of communism emanates from international ideological
attractions of world peace and social reform.' Its threat lies in the use
of that idealism to cajole the allegiance of Americans to a foreign
power.' Thus, the problem of communism transcends the traditional
legislative technique employed by a sovereign in a world of nation
states.4
Since, to be effective, efforts to control Russian communism in the
United States may necessitate control of such disaffected Americans,5 the
advocacy of such restraints requires a shift in attitude toward civil liber-
ties. Testing the desirability of this shift poses the fundamental dilemma:
"Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its
*This is the first of two instalments. The second will appear in the Spring 1949 issue
of the QUARTERLY. The relevant provisions of the Mundt-Nixon Bill discussed in this arti-
cle will be found in the appendix to this instalment.
ITn-E CO %"rnrNST MANIFESTO OF MARx AND ENGELS (D. Ryazanoff) (1847).
2 This appeal reaches Americans of different social strata. As affecting intellectuals see
Warshaw, Middle Class Mass Culture and the Intellectual's Problem, Commentary, Dec.
1947, p. 538. "But in this country there was a time when virtually all intellectual vitality
was derived in one way or another from the Communist Party." As affecting immigrants
of the lower economic classes see Barnes, The Foreign Policy of the American Communist
Party, Foreign Affairs, April 1948, pp. 421, 429.
3REPORT OF THE ROYAL COmmISSION APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE TIIE FACTS RELATING
TO THE COMMUJNICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS OF SECRET INFORmATION TO AGENTS oF A
FOREIGN POwER 57 (1946), hereinafter referred to as the CANADIAN REPORT. "Perhaps the
most startling single aspect of the entire Fifth Column network is the uncanny success
with which the Soviet agents were able to find Canadians who were willing to betray their
country." Surprisingly, the American Communist Party has not exhibited any of the
tendencies toward nationalism which presently characterized most other communist par-
ties. The shift has rather been from theoretical communism toward a completely pro-
Soviet attitude. Barnes, The Foreign Policy of the American Communist Party, Foreign
Affairs, April 1948, p. 429; Moore, The Communist Party of the U. S. A-An Analysis of a
Social Movement, 39 Am. PoL. Sci. REV. 31, 34 (1945).
4
"The United States has blundered and stumbled, seeking to apply Anglo-Saxon juris-
prudence to a situation not controlled by the Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, or the
statute books." Newsweek, May 10, 1948, p. 21, col. 3; Att'y Gen. Clark, Statement before
House Committee on Un-American Activities, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-12 (1948);cf. Insti-
tute of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda: The Method of Suppression,
37 ILL L. REV. 193 (1942).
5E.g., CRAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMUNIST INFILTRATION TTHE UNITED STATES
(1946); Eastman, Stalin's American Power, Reader's Digest, Dec. 1941, p. 39. But see
Knepper, Should We Outlaw the Communist Party?, Forum, June 1947, p. 497.
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people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?" 6 This dilemma re-
quires that legislation, while adequately curbing communism, must hold
to a minimum the dangers of infringing civil liberties.
This article, then, will attempt, in light of this test, to evaluate past
proposals and to suggest alternate methods of dealing with the problem
of communism. However, it must be remembered that emphasis on the
tecnhiques of legislation risks the masking of the basic problem-the
authenticity of the factual premises on which such legislation is based.
Assumptions of Fact
There are many divergent views as to the degree to which domestic
communism endangers our national security, and these varying opinions
cannot be correlated mechanically with the political and economic ideolo-
gies of their advocates. Both because of the broad compass of the subject
matter and the difficulty of achieving a tabula rasa, it was found unfeasi-
ble to attempt a gathering and evaluation of facts to determine the rela-
tive merits of these conflicting positions. Emphasis, rather, has been
placed on the methods of dealing with the challenge of communism.
Therefore, we have assumed the following premises which, while reason-
able,' do characterize that challenge as highly dangerous and deleteri-
ous to our welfare:
1. The Communist Party of the United States, as it now exists,
is not only a political party but also an agency for the domestic at-
tainment of the ideologies, objectives, and supremacy of a foreign
power.8
2. The establishment of that foreign power's supremacy in any
country results in the complete subordination of individual to
6See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, quoting President Lincoln, in Minersville School Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 596, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010, 1013 (1940) ; H. R. REP. No. 1844, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1948); Cushman, National Defense and the Retention of Civil Liberties, 9 KAN.
CiTy L. REv. 63 (1941).7Although a reviewing tribunal might reach a different conclusion de novo, it is sub-
mitted that there is substantial evidence to enable a reasonable and impartial man to
make the assumptions herein set forth.8E.g., H. R. REP. No. 1844, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 3 (1948); H. R. REP. No. 209, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); William C. Bullitt, Hearings before the House Committee on Un-
American Activities on H. R. 1884 and H. R. 2122, 80th Cong, 1st Sess. 4, 5 (1947);
Gouzenko, CANADrAN REPoRT 29 (1946). But cf. DRArt RESOLUTION OR =x NATIOxAL
CoNvENTION, C. P. U. S. A., Political Affairs, June 1948, p. 509.
As to the continuous secret existence of the Communist International even after publicly
announced dissolution on May 15 and June 16, 1943, see CAwADIA REPORT 37-41 (1946);
Victor A. Kravchenko, Hearings before House Committee on Un-American Activities on H. R.
1884 and H. R. 2122, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1947); cf. George Hewett (former member
of the Nat'l Committee of the Communist Party), N. Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1948, p. 9, col. 2.
The Cominform seemingly has now taken over its functions.
As to the almost complete correlation through the years between the Communist
Party line and the interest of the Soviet Union see, e.g., Davenport, Trouble in Paradise,
Colliers, Aug. 10, 1946, p. 145; Goldbloom, American Communism, Party of the Right,
Common Sense, September 1944, p. 305; Ross, It's Tough to be a Communist, Harper's
Mag., June 1946, p. 528.
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state, in the denial of liberties characteristic of a representative
form of government, and in the maintenance of control through fear
and coercion.'
3. The communists, apparently committed to these ethical
values and believing that ends justify means,"0 would at the op-
portune time overthrow by force and violence our political and
economic structure."
4. There exists in this country a Fifth Column, engaged in
espionage and propaganda,13 organized and directed by foreign
agents within the United States. 4
5. The Communist Party in this country is the principal recruit-
ing base for this Fifth Column; it not only supplies personnel with
adequately "developed" motivation, but provides the organiza-
tional framework within which recruiting is carried out safely and
efficiently. 5
6. Although the American Communist Party has relatively few
enrolled members,'" its singleness of purpose, central control of ac-
9 E.g, H. R. 5852, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (2) (1948), hereinafter called the MUNr-
NixoN BILL; HOUSE Doc. No. 754, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); CRAMBER OF COMMERCE,
COMM rUNIST INLTRATION Ii TH UNITED STATES 708 (1946). For a description of com-
munist impact on other countries, see Van Dyke, Position and Prospects of the Communists
in France, 63 PoL.. Sci. Q. 45 (1948); Steed, Duff, and Soloveytchik, Darkness over Czecho-
slovakia, Contemporary, April 1948, p. 193; cf. Alexander, Decline of Latin American
Communist Parties, Modern Review, Mar.-Apr. 1948, p. 220.
1OBarnes, The Foreign Policy of the American Communist Party, 26 FOREIGN AzAnIRs
421, 426 (1948); Coyle, Tolerance and Treason, 37 YALE REvIEw 411-13 (1948).
ll!Eg., H. R. REP. No. 209, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); Moore, The Communist Party
of the U. S. A.-An Analysis of a Social Movement, 39 Am. poL.. Sci. REV. 31, 34 (1945);
N. Y. Times, May 12, 1948, p. 1, col. 6.
"They [Communists] openly declare that their purposes can only be achieved by the
forcible overthrow of the whole extant social order." THE CoMrUNisT MANIPESTO OF
MARX AND ENGELS 68 (D. Ryazanoff) (1847). But see Note, 51 YALE L. J. 1215 (1942) for
the doubtful value of using such writings today. And communists have denied that they
now advocate the use of force and violence. E.g., Dennis, The Present R61e of the Com-
munist Party, Political Affairs, March 1948, p. 207; N. Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1948, p. 6, col 6.
12 CHAMER OF COMMERCE, COMMUNISM EXPOSED 17 (1947); Newsweek, Feb. 17, 1947,
p. 29, col. 1; Bentley, N. Y. Times, July 31, 1948, p. 1, col. 5; J. E. Hoover, N. Y. Times,
Feb. 7, 1947, p. 3, col. 3; cf. CANADIAN REPORT 11, 693 (1946).
For possible sabotage in case of war with Soviet Russia, see Valtin, A B C of Sabotage,
American Mercury, Apr. 1941, p. 417.
13 Moore, The Communist Party of the U. S. A-An Analysis of a Social Movement,
39 Air. PoL. Sci. REV. 31, 34, 35 (1945); La Follette, Jr., Turn the Light on Communism,
Colliers, Feb. 8, 1947, pp. 22, 74; cf. CANADIAN REPORT 82 (1946). Among others, Henry
Wallace is reported to have agreed that this propaganda necessitated countermeasures.
Newsweek, July 8, 1946, p. 21, col. 3.14 Solow, Stalin's American Passport Mill, American Mercury, July 1939, p. 303; Ellis,
American Civil Rights in a Revolutionary Age, Forum, Feb. 1948, p. 133; cf. CANADIAN
REPORT 685 (1946).
15
"The Communist' Party of the United States is a 5th column if there ever was one."
J. E. Hoover, Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on H. R.
1884 and H. R. 2122, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947); cf. CANADIAN REPORT 44 (1946).
On page 686, the CANADIAN REPORT makes the following finding of fact: "Membership in
communist organizations or a sympathy towards communist ideologies was the primary
force which caused these agents to agree to do the acts referred to in their individual cases."16 Estimates of membership have ranged from 74,000 to 100,000. Att'y Gen. Clark, N. Y.
Times, March 28, 1948, p. 5, col. 8; J. E. Hoover, Hearings before the House Committee on
Un-American Activities on H. R. 1884 and H. R. 2122, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1947).
There is little evidence of any growth in membership, N. Y. Times, March 7, 1948, p. 10,
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tivities, infiltration into positions of control in both public and
private agencies, 17 operations of "front" organizations," and aid
from fellow travelers19 greatly magnifies its danger to this country.20
7. International travel of representatives of the world com-
munist program is important for purposes of communication and
coordination of activities in furtherance of its objectives.2'
Legislative Objectives
Although many, and probably most people are in favor of some legis-
lation to control or curb the American Communist Party, there has
been little crystallization of thought on exactly what that legislation
should seek to accomplish. An adequate appraisal of neither alter-
nate techniques nor the efficacy of any particular bill can be made
unless specific legislative objectives have been framed.
Certain legislative goals can be formulated from our prior assump-
tions, from the history of proposed federal bills22 and from the general
col. 1, and there is some prediction that party membership will decline in 1948. Prof. L.
Hacker, N. Y. Times, April 15, 1948, p. 42, col. 8.
1 7Labor: Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities Regarding
Communism in Labor Unions in the United States, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); CAmER
oF Coamc cE, Coimmmau Ts wITmN T E LABOR MOVIMNT (1947); Patch, Communism
in America, Editorial Research Report, Nov. 13, 1946, pp. 794-98.
Government: C [BER or ComMERCE, CommuN-sTs vwiT= = GoVaRN=Tr (1947);
La Follette, Jr., Turn the Light on Communism, Colliers, Feb. 8, 1947, p. 22, col, 3;
Bentley, N. Y. Times, July 31, 1948, p. 1, col. 5.
General: CHAM ER OF CONMERCE, CoMUNIsT IN TRAT7oN 3N T= UzNTD STATES
(1946); Franklin, Why I Broke with the Communists, Harper's Mag., May 1947, p. 412.
'
8 MUNDT-NxoN Bisz. § 2 (7); H. R. REP. No. 271, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-18 (1947)
(American Youth for Democracy); CMCAGO JOURNLoF COMMaRCE, THE ComM-UNsT
FT CoLUM (1946); Lyons, It Was Smart To Be Red, Sat. Eve. Post, Dec. 9, 1939,
p. 25. For factors testing whether an organization is a communist front, compare MUNDT-
NixoN BILL § 3 (4), with J. E. Hoover, Hearings before the House Committee in Un-
American Activities on H. R. 1884 and H. R. 2122, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947).
19 "What is important is the claim of the Communists themselves that for every party
members there are ten others ready, willing, and able to do the party's work." J. E. Hoover,
Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on H. R. 1884 and H. R.
2122, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1947). See Daily Worker, Aug. 25, 1937, p. 2. For a
test of who is a fellow traveler see CHAMBER OF COmmERCE, ColxcrsumsTs WITHN THE
GOVERITINT 32-33 (1947); Att'y Gen. Clark, How to Fight Communism, Newsweek, June
9, 1947, p. 30, col. 3.2 0A clear and present danger: MUNDT-NIxoNr BrLa § 2 (11); H. R. RFP. No. 1844, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1948); Ellis, American Civil Rights in a Revolutionary Age, Forum,
April 1948, pp. 193, 197. But cf. Life, June 14, 1948, p. 20, col. 2; N. Y. Times, May 23,
1948, p. 20, col. 2; N. Y. Times, May 23, 1948, § 4, p. 7, col. 1.
In case of conflict with the Soviet Union: J. E. Hoover, Hearings before House Committee
on Un-American Activities on H. R. 1884 and H. R. 2122, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 37 (1947).
For an example of self-incriminating ambiguity on this score, see William Z. Foster, N. Y.
Times, May 30, 1948, p. 28, col. 3.2
'MuiNr-NixoN BmL § 2 (8). "An American passport mill is almost indispensable in
any [communist] espionage set-up." Solow, Stalin's American Passport Mill, American Mer-
cury, July 1939, p. 303.22Due to comparatively little Senate action, almost all of the legislative history relat-
ing to bills attempting to curb or control the Communist Party is found in discussions
in the House of Representatives. The explanation seems to be traceable to the Senate's
lesser enthusiasm for communist controls and the lack of a standing committee on sub-
versive activities in that body.
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objectives of the proponents of anti-communist legislation. These are:2
1. To sever the umbilical cord between American communism
and world communism by restricting the travel of communists
from or to the United States;24
2. To take additional security measures to prevent communist
infiltration into positions of federal employment, or at least those
positions which involve trust or influence;'
3. To prevent communists from gaining support, financial or
otherwise, from those who would withdraw their aid if the true
nature and purposes of the supported organizations were dis-
closed; 26
4. To take such measures as will enable consumers of com-
munist propaganda27 to become cognizant of its origin;'
5. To acquire such information as will enable the Government
to know the identity and whereabouts of all those whose "allegi-
ance" is to the Communist Party;29
6. To make criminal those activities which have as their pur-
pose the setting up in the United States of a totalitarian govern-
ment under foreign control;30
7. To deny the communists the use of the ordinary means of
the democratic process, 1 and the privileges of American citizen-
2 3The following objectives were arranged numerically, proceeding from the least ob-
jectionable, in the light of their impact on civil liberties.2 4 M D1T-NIxoN B.EL § 7; H. R. REP. No. 1844, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1948); Rep.
Mundt, 94 Cong. Rec. 5996 (May 14, 1948); Rep. Nixon, N. Y. Times, April 10, 1948,
p. 1, col. 2.
25H. R. REP. No. 1844, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1948); CHmilER oF COmmERCE, Com-
MIsNITS WITIN TM GoVEVaRMNT 27-37 (1947); Sat. Eve. Post, Jan. 22, 1944, p. 92,
col. 3; cf. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947); cf. CAADIAN REPORT 689 (1946).2 6MruNDT-NxoN Brr.L § 2 (7); Rep. Lucas, 94 Cong. Rec. 6270, 6271 (May 19, 1948);
N. Y. Times, April 10, 1948, p. 1, col. 2.2 7The modem and subtle technique of propaganda has led to demand for such action.
Besides producing propaganda relating to American and Soviet foreign policy, an important
factor in communist appeal has been the propaganda program urging adoption of domestic
"social reforms." As such reforms appeal to a large segment of the American population,
this propaganda serves not only as a recruiting device, but also, by associating such domes-
tic propaganda with the propaganda of a foreign state, serves to "carry" by implication
that state's propaganda. A commercial example of this non-rational but effective tech-
nique is the use of a pretty girl in cigarette advertisements. CANADIA R'oRT 82 (1946);
cf. J. E. Hoover, Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on
H. R. 1884 and H. R. 2122, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1947).2 8See Institute of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda: The Method of
Exposure, 10 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 107, 108 (1943); cf. Smith, Subversive Propaganda, The
Past and the Present, 29 GEo. L. J. 809, 825 (1941); Sen. Taft, How Should Democracy
Deal with Groups Which Aim to Destroy Democracy?, Town Meeting, May 18, 1948, p. 7.2 9MurDT-N oN BiLL § 8 (d) (4); Rep. Mundt, 94 Cong. Rec. 5995 (May 14, 1948);
CIMBER OF COIMERCE, CommuHism EXPOSED 21 (1947) ; Sen. Bridges, American Foreign
Policy and Communism, Vital Speeches, April 15, 1948, pp. 391, 393; cf. New Yorker,
June 12, 1948, p. 17. This information would be especially valuable in case of conflict
with the Soviet Union.
30H. R. RaP. No. 1844, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1948); Stassen, N. Y. Times, April 3,
1948, p. 13, cols. 1, 2; MUtmT-NIxoN BiLL § 4; H. R. 4581, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947)
(defined communism as treasonable); H. R. 2122, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
3'H. R. 5615, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H. R. 4482, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947);
Sat. Eve. Post, Dec. 9, 1939, p. 24; Dewey and Stassen Debate, Vital Speeches, June 1,
1948, pp. 482, 484. But cf. Paulding, 100,000 Communists, Commonweal, April 11, 1947,
p. 631.
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ship82 or domicile.83
Although the Mundt-Nixon Bill was not passed by the 80th Con-
gress, and its ultimate fate is unknown at the present time, the follow-
ing discussion will be focused on its terms; the Bill will probably serve
as the point of departure if further attempts to control the communist
movement are initiated in the future; but whether or not future legis-
lation to control the communists parallels the Bill, the constitutional
problems raised by it and discussed here will also be raised by any
legislation to control minority political groups.
I. Restricting Communist TravelP4
Since this objective is merely to cut communist communication lines,
we have limited our discussion to regulation and prevention of com-
munist travel by controlling issue and use of visas and passports.8 5
The fact that the only significant criminal convictions 36 of com-
munists in the United States have revolved about visas and passports
attests to the importance communists attach to their possession. Though
other means of communication are available, the secrecy and vast scope
of the world communist movement make personal contact imperative
for determining policies in various nations.3" Further, passport control
may prevent Americans from securing the traditional indoctrination
given most non-Russian communist leaders.38 As international travel
3 2 MuNDT-NxoN BrLL § 5; cf. Sat. Eve. Post, Dec. 9, 1939, p. 24, col. 1.
33 Att'y Gen. Clark, Statement before House Committee on Un-American Activities,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1948); N. Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1948, p. 28, col. 2.34 Since this article proceeds in terms of legislative objectives, its structure cannot follow
that of an actual statute. The following overlapping problems will be dealt with under the
objectives deemed to be most suitable:
1) Clear and present danger rule is discussed under Criminal Sanctions.
2) Guilt by association is discussed under Criminal Sanctions.
3) Defining a communist front organization is discussed under Communist Front
Organizations.
4) Defining a communist political organization is discussed under Communist Political
Organizations.
5) Who is a member of an organization is discussed under Communist Political Or-
ganizations.
6) Administrative procedure and judicial review are discussed under Communist Politi-
cal Organizations.
For a brief discussion of the whole Bill see Wheedon, The Mundt-Nixon Bill, Editorial
Research Report, Feb. 11, 1948, pp. 9 1B1 1 6 .3 5The curbing of communism through immigration and deportation policies is applicable
here only as relevant to the actual stratagem of severing communication. Such policies
will be discussed under the last legislative objective, denaturalization and deportation.3 6 Browder v. United States, 312 U. S. 335, 61 Sup. Ct. 599 (1941); Gerhardt Eisler,
N. Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1948, p. 3, cois. 5, 7.3 7Though there are other methods of severing communication besides denying physical
access to or from the United States, such as censorship and public ownership of all short-
wave transmitters, it was felt that these extreme measures would not be considered.3 8Solow, Stalin's American Passport Mill, American Mercury, July 1939, p. 303; cf.
MUNvT-NxoN BILL § 3 (3) (f). Moreover, our loose passport control has made it possi-
ble for foreign communists-relying on our polyglot population-to -use forged American
passports throughout the world without exciting suspicion. Solow, id. at 303.
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without visas and passports is virtually impossible,39 their effective con-
trol prevents communist travel.
Because civil rights are not absolute but are relative to the legiti-
mate interests of government, in passing on the desirability of this legis-
lative objective, reference must be made to the traditional spheres of
control which have been delegated to a representative form of govern-
ment. Though rigid control of passports was "once a sure index to the
character of a nation's government," as it flourished only in the police
state,40 control of foreign travel has always been recognized as a sover-
eign function; 41 refusal of the privilege of travel to persons with radi-
cal tendencies has now become commonplace.4 2 The first United States
statute to reflect this tendency was the War Service Passport Act of
1918,4  which gave the president power to prescribe limitations on
travel for both aliens and citizens. Judicial interpretation has given
the Secretary of State, the diplomatic staff, and the consular service-
all of whom act under the president's authority-absolute discretion
over the issuance and revocation of passports and visas.44
Although the sovereign has absolute power to prohibit foreign inter-
course, it has been held that an expressed arbitrary reason given by
an individual officer for denying such travel may be attacked." And
it would seem that a discriminating statute which was found to be
arbitrary would fall afoul of the Fifth Amendment. 46 But to make a
blanket refusal of visas or passports to either aliens or citizens acting
in behalf of a foreign government would seem clearly related to legiti-
mate objectives.
3940 STAT. 559 (1918), 22 U. S. C. § 224 (1946); 40 STAT. 227, 22 U. S. C. § 221 (1946).
Issuance of American passports is now carefully regulated. N. Y. Times, April 27, 1941,
§ 7, p. 21.4 0Hildred, Very Suspicious Characters, Sat. Eve. Post, Dec. 7, 1946, p. 73.4 1See Rex v. Braisford, [19051 2 K. B. 730, 745; Benish's Case, U. S. FoaxRoa REL.:
1893 at 3, 24 (Dep't State 1896).42 Hildred, Very Suspicious Characters, Sat. Eve. Post, Dec. 7, 1946, p. 17.
4340 STAT. 559 (1918), 22 U. S. C. § 223 (1940), as amended, 41 STAT. 1205, 1217 (1921),
22 U. S. C. § 227 (1946). Subsequent to the First World War, this power was not
utilized by the President until he required by executive order of Jan. 12, 1927 that all
aliens, as a condition of entry, present a passport duly visaed by a consular officer of
the United States and further authorized the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Labor
(who was then in charge of immigration) to make additional rules and regulations. Exec.
Order No. 4125, 22 CoDE FED. REaGS. § 33.1 (1939).4 4United States ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F. 2d 288 (C. C. A. 2d 1927); United States
ex rel. Johanson v. Phelps, 14 F. 2d 679 (D. Vt. 1926); 23 O.'s. ArT'y GEN. 509 (1901).
For an extreme example see United States ex rel. Strachey v. Reimer, 101 F. 2d 267
(C. C. A. 2d 1939), 52 HARv. L. REv. 833 (revocation of visa by consul after commence-
ment of travel). But see Strachey, The Law of the Strachey Case, New Republic, Nov. 9,
1938, p. 11.
45 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325, 59 Sup. Ct. 884 (1939); see U. S. v. Karnuth, 29 F. 2d
314, 316 (W. D. N. Y. 1928).4 6See note 68 infra. However, because of the Federal Government's power over foreign
relations, the court may refuse to entertain jurisdiction where it might raise a political
question. See notes 159-60 infra.
47See Note, Conduct Proscribed as Promoting Violent Overthrow of the Government,
[Vol. 34
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Though the receipt of a passport or a visa is a privilege accorded by
the sovereign, a condition cannot be placed on its issuance which vio-
lates the First Amendment.," True, the refusal of foreign travel to
communists will, to some extent, deter freedom of expression by put-
ting a premium on disassociation from communist tenets. But if the
court finds that the substantive evils sought to be avoided by the statute
do in fact exist and that on the basis of a value judgment they out-
weigh the infringement on the First Amendment, the legislation will
be upheld,49 even though it might encroach on the policy expressed by
that Amendment." The slight indirect deterrent on the freedom of
speech of those51 who seek to further the world communist movement
by use of the privilege of travel to and from the United States would
not seem to outweigh the taking of an effective step to prohibit such
travel.2 Since almost all conceivable objections were raised against the
Mundt-Nixon Bill in the House, the complete lack of debate on this
legislative objective would seem to support the validity of the above
judgment.5 3
In light of the communist need to travel, and the importance of our
taking adequate prophylactic measures, criminal sanctions to enforce
a prohibition against travel would seem desirable.
In attaching criminal penalties to a communist's passport applica-
tion, §§ 7 (a) and 15 (c) of the Mundt-Nixon Bill remove a traditional
discretion vested in the executive, a discretion which it may be advisa-
ble to retain for special circumstances in the future. But as one of the
purposes of this section is to limit the liberal use of discretionary power
by executive employees, such special action should result only by a
presidential executive order. To retain executive discretion, the Mundt-
Nixon Bill's criminal sanctions must be shifted from the mere making
61 HaRv. L. REv. 1215 (1948); 54 HEuAv. L. Rav. 155 (1940). But see Feinglass v. Reinecke,
48 F. Supp. 438, 439 (N. D. Ill. 1942).
4 8See Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. or PA. L. REv. 879 (1929); Hale, Uncon-
stitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COL. L. REV. 321 (1935).49See discussion of clear and present danger under the objective, Criminal Sanctions.
If possession of an issued passport were considered a property right, a due process prob-
lem would arise in its revocation; however, even then the exercise of such revocation
probably would be reasonable.
50 CHAFEE, FREEDOM Or SPEECH 284 (1920).
51However, as Professor Chafee points out, freedom of speech should not be thought of
merely as an individual right, for the community as a whole has to some extent a social
interest in having an opportunity to receive each individual's views. CHAFEE, FREEDOM
Or SPEECH 282 (1920); see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 66 Sup. Ct. 276 (1946);
Note, Inseparability in Application of Statutes Impairing Civil Liberties, 61 HARv. L. REv.
1208 (1948).
52It may well be that "to democrats they [passport measures] are a storm warning .
invariably a prelude to indiscriminate war against the left." Nation, Feb. 3, 1940, p. 17,
col. 2. But this argument would vitiate any security measures against communism no
matter how pressing the circumstances.
5394 Cong. Rec. 6279 (May 19, 1948).
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of a passport application by a member of a communist political or-
ganization, to his actual failure to disclose cognizance of membership
in that organization. Though this step may seem to duplicate existing
law regarding passport fraud, 4 the result is a uniform requirement for
the transmission of this information. Moreover, as the Bill, in § 7 (b),
adequately penalizes officials and employees for knowingly issuing pass-
ports to communists, discretion is effectively removed from the lower
echelons of the executive branch. Though § 7 does not contain any
provision regarding visas, subsection (b) could be utilized to include
a provision effectively prohibiting a member of the diplomatic or con-
sular service from knowingly issuing a visa to a communist. This would
furnish the only available means of regulating visa issuance, for crimi-
nal sanctions would have no extra-territorial effect on applicants.
Because those who are members of communist front organizations,
but not communist political organizations, are unlikely to be entrusted
with the determination and communication of important policy con-
siderations, there would seem to be little need for restricting their
foreign travel. Moreover, such restrictions might tend toward the in-
discriminate penalizing of liberals by those issuing passports. There-
fore; it would seem that § 7 is correct in limiting the sanction to mem-
bers of communist political organizations.
Recommendations:
Section 7 (a). It shall be unlawful for any member of a com-
munist political organization, knowing that the organization is a
communist political organization-
(1) to make application for a passport, or the renewal of a
passport, to be issued or renewed by or under the authority of the
United States without revealing that he is a member of such or-
ganization, or,
(2) after sixty days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, to use or to attempt to use a passport issued before the
enactment of this Act.55
(b) It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the
United States to issue a passport or grant a visa to, or to renew
the passport or visa of, any individual, knowing that such individu-
al is a member of a communist political organization; provided
however, that this subsection shall not be applicable where the
Executive Order of the President of the United States authorizes
the issuance or granting of such passport or visa, or renewal thereof,
to any such individual by name.
5440 STAT. 227 (1917), 22 U. S. C. § 220 (1946).
5 5In lieu of the clause "to use a passport theretofore issued," which is found in § 7 (a) (2),
we have substituted "to use a passport issued before the enactment of this Act." This
was done to avoid the possible ambiguity of "theretofore" as referring to a definite date.
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1I. Federal Employment
The augmented fear of Russian Communism has led to an increasing
demand-in spite of vigorous objections56-- for the removal of its ad-
vocates from federal employment. Under our present economy, in
which government employment plays a relatively minor r6le in the chan-
nels of individual opportunity, the impact of such a program on civil
liberties is not very great. However, undesirable ramifications may
result in some cases of removal from a presently held job, such as prob-
lems of readjustment created by specialized government employment,
or blacklisting by private employers. But in light of recent disclosure
of large scale espionage activities in America, " as well as in Canad 7
there would seem to be maximum justification for countermeasures
against communists in our government.
Should such countermeasures be applied only to those in positions
which involve trust, influence, or opportunity for espionage?58 The
difficulty of administering any such distinction, the subtle influence of
communists even in subordinate positions, and the irony of the Gov-
ernment's financially supporting those who are committed to the aid
of a foreign power, may lead to the conclusion that an all-embrasive
prohibition is needed. But the barring of a stenographer from the SEC
because she is a communist is an act largely retributive, going beyond
the reasons underlying this legislative objective, though it may be ra-
tionalized in terms of "government integrity." 59 Moreover, a corollary
of prohibiting communists from all government jobs may well be the
creation of a secret organization, examining the private lives of hun-
dreds of thousands and compiling vast secret dossiers.6 0
Before the last war, emphasis had been increasingly placed on protec-
tion against political discrimination.61 Not until after 1939, when the
56E.g., A. L. Pomerantz, N. Y. Times, May 4, 1947, § 4, p. 10, col. 5; O'Brian, Loyalt
Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 IIARv. L. REv. 592 (1948). Compare the interesting
juxtapositions of the following sections appearing in [1933] REICHSGESETZBLATT, pt. I,
p. 195: First Regulation for Administration of the Law for the Restoration of the Profes-
sional Civil Service of 11 April 1933-
"1. Unfit, are all civil servants who belong to the communist party or communist-aid
or supplementary organization. They are, therefore, to be discharged.
"2. If a civil servant was not already a civil servant on 1 August 1914, he must
prove that he is of Aryan descent. .
56'See note 12 supra.
57CAxADI_ REPORT (1946).
58As compared with Britain and Canada, the United States seems to be willing to go
beyond this line. CAxADiNnr REPORT 689 (1946); Time, March 29, 1948, p. 40, col. 2
(statement by Mr. Attlee).
59H. R. REP. No. 1844, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1948).6OFor a convincing article on the desirability of such a limitation see O'Brian, Loyalty
Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 HtAv. L. REV. 592 (1948). But ef. CmHMER OF COM-
meERCE, CoimrumsTs wziTN v GOVERNMENT (1947).
61E.g., 37 STAT. 555 (1912), 5 U. S. C. § 652 (1946); N. Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 25; see
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Hatch Act62 was passed, did a mutation in governmental policy take
place. 3 As a result, there is little constitutional law dealing directly
with political discrimination in public employment.
Since it is generally agreed that there is no "property" in a public
job,0 the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment would seem to
afford direct protection against political discrimination only if the right
to such a job can be included within the concept of "liberty."'  Even
if this latter suggestion, which finds little support in the decisions, were
adopted, it would only strike down legislation which is arbitrary, or
without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of
the government to effect.66 An identical test67 of a statute's constitu-
tional validity can be reached by embodying within the Fifth Amend-
ment the limitations on discriminatory legislation established by the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.s
Because of the in terrorem effect of discriminatory legislation on
freedom of speech, some persons have advocated that the clear and
present danger rule should be the applicable constitutional standard
instead of the reasonable relationship tes. 69 If this view were adopted,
the court would again have to weigh the extent of the infringement with
the existence of substantive evils. But in fact, the language of one
Supreme Court decision7" would seemingly allow complete arbitrary
discrimination on the basis that the government in such cases is acting
in its proprietary capacity, and is therefore pari passu with private
Murray, The Right to Equal Opportunity in Employment, 33 CAIF. L. REv. 388, 417 n.
108 (1945).
6253 STAT. 1148 (1939), as amended, 5 U. S. C. 118 j (Supp. 1948).
68E.g., 55 STAT. 403 (1941) (proviso in appropriations bill); 56 STAT. 1053 (1942),
5 U. S. C. § 652 (1946) (summary removal from War and Navy Departments in interest
of national security); 5 CODE FED. REcS. § 18.2 (C) (4) (Cune. Supp. 1943) (reasonable
doubt as to disloyalty).
A similar shift occurred in the states. E.g., N. Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 12-a; see Groner,
State Control of Subversive Activities in the United States, 9 FED. B. J. 61, 69 (1947).
64E.g., Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 159 F. 2d 22 (App. D. C. 1946), cert. denied, 331
U. S. 865, 67 Sup. Ct. 979 (1947); Wetzel v. McNutt, 4 F. Supp. 233 (S. D. Ind. 1933);
see 2 COOLEY, CONSTTTONA LIITAiONS 746 n. 1 (8th ed. 1927).
65See Rogers v. Common Council, 123 N. Y. 173, 186, 25 N. E. 274, 277 (1890); Note,
60 HARv. L. REv. 779 (1947).66 Himbayshi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 63 Sup. Ct. 1375 (1943); VA14 COTT, CoN-
STTiTONAL LAW § 154 (1948).
6 7 E.g., Ohio ex rel. Clark v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 630 (1927); Ameri-
can Sugar Refining Co. v. New Orleans, 179 U. S. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. 646 (1900); see Note,
60 H Rv. L. Rxv. 779 (1947). A rational basis for legislative judgment is all that is re-
quired. E.g., Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot's Comm'rs, 330 U. S. 552, 67 Sup. Ct.
910 (1947).
68 United States v. Schneider, 45 F. Supp. 848 (E. D. Wis. 1942) (prohibition against
work relief for communists, Nazis and aliens held invalid); United States v. Yount, 267
Fed. 861 (W. D. Pa. 1920); see Note, 48 CoL. L. REv. 253, 256 (1948).
69 See Notes, Conduct Proscribed as Promoting Violent Overthrow of the Government,
61 HARv. L. REV. 1215 (1948) ; 96,U. oF PA. L. REV. 381, 401 n. 155 (1948).7OHeim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175, 36 Sup. Ct. 78 (1915).
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entrepreneurs. 71 This has been vigorously criticized,71 and its repudi-
ation is foreshadowed by a recent statement by Mr. Justice Reed that
no one would deny the lack of congressional power to "enact a regu-
lation providing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed
to federal office, or that no federal employee shall attend mass or take
any active part in missionary work."'
Another possible constitutional limitation on political discrimination
is the prohibition against bills of attainder.74 This condemns a legis-
lative act which inflicts punishment without a jury trial on either
named individuals"5 or easily ascertainable members of a group.76 The
recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Lovett made clear
that "permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve the Gov-
ernment is punishment, and of a most severe type. 7 7 This prohibition
will be specifically dealt with in relation to the problem of defining those
to be covered by this Act, as it is felt that whether the legislation is
considered a bill of attainder may well depend upon whether that defini-
tion establishes an easily ascertainable group.7"
Another limitation on congressional action to remove certain federal
officers stems from the separation of powers. 79 The Myers case 0 denied
legislative power to regulate presidential removal of officers whose du-
ties are predominantly executive or administrative."- Lacking power to
restrict executive action, seemingly Congress would also lack the power
to remove these officers.8 2 The Court in that case explicitly distinguished,
7 1See Bartlett, C. J., concurring in People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 175, 108 N. E. 427,
434 (1915), afi'd, 239 U. S. 195, 36 Sup. Ct. 85 (1915). But see Gianatasio v. Kaplan,
142 Misc. 611, 613, 255 N. Y. Supp. 102, 105 (Sup. 'Ct. 1931), aff'd, 257 N. Y. 531, 178
N. E. 782 (1931), appeal dismissed, 284 U. S. 595, 52 Sup. Ct. 203 (1932).72Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 CoL. L. Rnv. 99 (1916).73United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 100, 67 Sup. Ct. 556,
569-70 (1947).
74U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 9. A .similar prohibition is found against the states. U. S.
CoNsT. Art. I, § 10.
751 COOLEY, CoNsnOuTioNAL LIMITATxoNS 536 (8th ed. 1927); Lovett v. United States,
328 U. S. 303, 66 Sup. Ct. 1073 (1946).76Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1867) ; cf. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U.S.
1867) (state bill of attainder).
77328 U. S. 303, 316, 66 Sup. Ct. 1073, 1079 (1946).
7sSee notes 102 et seq., infra.
79U. S. CoNsT. Art. H, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4.
8OMyers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926).81Accord, Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 115 F. 2d 990 (C. C. A. 6th 1940).
However, the Myers case was qualified in Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U. S.
602, 55 Sup. Ct. 869 (1935).82
"Our conclusion on the merits .. .is ... that Article II excludes the exercise of legis.
lative power by Congress to provide for appointments and removals, except only as grant-
ed therein to Congress in the matter of inferior officers ...after it has vested ... their
appointment in other authority than the President with the Senate's consent. . . ." Myers
v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 163-64, 47 Sup. Ct. 21, 41 (1926). See Mr. Justice Frank-
furter concurring in Lovett v. United States, 328 U. S. 303, 328, 66 Sup. Ct. 1073, 1085
(1946).
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however, the legitimate and often exercised congressional power to
prescribe qualifications for office, "provided of course that the quali-
fications do not so limit selection and so trench upon executive choice
as to be in effect legislative designation."'8 3 Even thbugh this seems to
be a valid constitutional limitation, its safeguards apply only to some
appointive officials.
Thus, although many constitutional issues may be presented, dis-
criminatory legislation as to most federal employees will be sustained,
if it has a rational basis.
The Hatch Act of 193984 the first important statute dealing with
political discrimination, forbids the employment of those who advocate
"the overthrow of our constitutional form of government." Lack of rigid
enforcement, difficulty of proving Communist Party membership, and
judicial recognition that membership in a political party does not, of
necessity, indicate acceptance of that party's program, 5 has rendered
the Act practically useless. 8
The President's Loyalty Order of March 21, 1947,8" lists as one of
the factors to be considered in determining disloyalty and subsequent
removal from federal employment:
"membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with
any foreign or domestic . . . -group . . . of persons, designated by
the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or sub-
versive .... ,8
This order should be compared with § 6 (a) of the proposed Mundt-
Nixon Bill which makes it unlawful for a member of a "communist poli-
tical organization," knowing it is such an organization, to seek89 or
accept federal employment without revealing his association, or to hold
any non-elective job thirty days after the effective date of the ActY0
For the first time such person's activity in the government is made a
8 3Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 163, 164, 47 Sup. Ct. 21, 41 (1926). See Mr.
Justice Brandeis dissenting, id. at 265, 274, 47 Sup. Ct. at 75, 78.
8453 STAT. 1148 (1939), as amended, 5 U. S. C. §§ 118i-118 n (Supp. 1948).
8 5Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333 (1943).
8 6 CHAMBER OF COIEUERCE, COM atnqISTS wITHI THE GOVERNmwT 16-17 (1947).8 TExec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947). Compare a similar policy in Great
Britain, Time, March 29, 1948, p. 40, col. 2.
88 Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REo. 1935, 1938 (1947).89 Besides the vagueness of what "to seek" federal employment constitutes, the word
would seem too drastic a prohibition.
9OEven if a communist reveals his affiliation to the employing officer, thus preventing
prosecution under' § 6 (a) (1), he would literally fall -under the language of § 6 (a) (2) as
thirty days after the bill's enactment he would be holding a non-elective job. Congress
apparently considered these two subsections were exclusive on the basis that the Loyalty
Order would prevent such a communist, once his identity was revealed, from working for
the Government. It is possible, moreover, that one who violates subsection (1) would
also immediately violate subsection (2).
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crime; penalties for violation of this section are the same as those ap-
plicable to passport violations.
This technique of criminal sanctions would seem to be the most
effective method of dealing with the problem. To say, for instance, that
an embezzler must merely return the money if apprehended, does not
prevent embezzlement; in addition, the ineffective sanction of a refund
would necessitate continual large scale security measures to police
persons having access to funds. 1 Where criminal sanctions exist, com-
munists will reconsider entering federal employment.
Section 7 of the Bill does not attempt to cover members of com-
munist front organizations. However, under the Loyalty Order, asso-
ciation in an organization labelled "subversive" by the Attorney Gen-
eral is a factor proving disloyalty;92 it puts the psychological, even if
not the legal, burden of proving his loyalty on the individual. Members
may be innocent of the fact of communist control of their organiza-
tion, as they may be working merely to effectuate a program of social
and political reform, and the Loyalty Order's in terrorem effect on mem-
bers of liberal associations is alarming. Thus, a combination of the
requirement of knowledge on the part of a member of a communist
front organization, which is not found in the Loyalty Order, and the
criminal sanction found in § 7 of the Mundt-Nixon Bill would seem
desirable.
Section 6 (b) of the Bill makes it unlawful for any officer or em-
ployee of the United States to appoint or employ any person, knowing
that such person is a member of a communist political organization.
As a practical matter this knowledge will be extremely difficult to
prove even in those few sporadic cases in which an employing official
aids a communist to violate § 6 (a) (1)." This subsection therefore
would seem undesirable when balanced against the effect it may have on
timid employing officials who may not desire to run the risk of hiring
a person whose political views have been labeled by opponents as "left
of center."
The procedural safeguards found in the Loyalty Order94 fall far short
9 1E.g., J. E. Hoover has stated that the President's Loyalty Order will not only require
investigation into the lives of almost fifty thousand persons, but also the checking of FBI
files concerning over two million employees, and this will no doubt include even those
in the lower echelons of government service. Hearings before the House Subcommittee on
Appropriations on Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1948, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38
(1947). For a bitter attack on the maintenance of a large scale organization to gather
information, see O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, "61 H~av. L. Rlv. 592,
609-10 (1948).9 2Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935, 1938 (1947).9 3 It is possible that even if such a provision were not made, such an official would
be criminally liable under normal criminal law as an accessory.
9 4There are four steps: (1) notice and sufficiently specific confrontation to enable a
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of the protection afforded by administrative bodies95 or the courts, yet
the severity of punishment is often greater, not only in its immediate
impact, but in the stigma attaching to the individual. The important
safeguard in evaluating evidence-the right of cross-examination-
"will probably not be practicable"96 in regard to the loyalty procedure.
Moreover, judicial review will probably be limited to procedural good
faith; 97 findings of fact, even if arbitrary, will not be disturbed."
Under § 6 (a) of the Mundt-Nixon Bill, and under our recommended
substitute for both the Bill and the Loyalty Order, violations would be
prosecuted through normal criminal trial procedure, safeguarded by
the requirements for proof beyond a reasonable doubt and for adequate
appellate review.
Recommendations:
1. Presidential revision of the Loyalty Order to strike out in
factor (f) the words "communist" and "subversive" as determina-
tives of disloyalty.99
2. Be it enacted:
Section 6 (a). It shall be unlawful for any member of a com-
munist political organization, knowing that the organization is a
communist political organization-
(1) to accept a non-elective position of security under the
United States; or
(2) after thirty days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, to hold any non-elective position of security under the United
States.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person (i) after a final order
of the Attorney General is issued classifying an organization as a
communist front organization according to the procedure established
by §§ 13 and 14 of this Act, and (ii) after notice has been posted
that this organization has been so classified-
(1) to hold any non-elective position of security under the
person to defend himself; (2) hearing, with right to counsel and right to present wit-
nesses; (3) appeal from Loyalty Board decision to head of own department; (4) appeal
to Civil Service Commission Loyalty Review Board for an advisory recommendation.
Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935, 1937-38 (1947).
9 5E.g., AD. PROC. AcT, 60 STAT. 237, 5 U. S. C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1946).
9 6Seth Richardson, U. S. Civil Service Comm'n Press Release, Dec. 23, 1947. As was
aptly stated in a recent article, "What a shock would come to any lawyer if he were to
witness a criminal trial and a conviction for crime based upon secret and undisclosed
evidence." O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 HARv. L. Rxv. 592, 609(1948).9 7Borak v. Biddle, 141 F. 2d 278 (App. D. C. 1944), cert. denied. 323 U. S. 738, 65
Sup. Ct. 42 (1944).9 8Eberlein v. United States, 257 U. S. 82, 42 Sup. Ct. 12 (1921); Levine v. Farley, 107
F. 2d 186 (App. D. C. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 622, 60 Sup. Ct. 377 (1940).
9It would seem that the Mundt-Nixon Bill does not change the effect of the Loyalty
Order but merely adds its own criminal sanctions. But cf. 94 Cong. Rec. 6007 (May 14,
1948).
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United States at the time of the posting of such notice and sixty
days thereafter to become or remain a member of this organiza-
tion as long as such classification remains attached to it.
(2) at any time subsequent to the posting of the notice
to hold any non-elective position of security under the United
States and sixty days after acquiring such a position of security
to remain or become a member of this organization as long as
such classification remains attached to it.
(c) "Positions of security" is herein defined as any office or em-
ployment which is determined by the ABC Board to involve trust,
influence, or opportunity for espionage.
(d) Any such determination as made in subsection (c) of this
section by the ABC Board shall be conclusive, unless found to be
arbitrary in a criminal prosecution under this section.
(e) It shall be the duty of the ABC Board to send each month
to all officers and employees in positions of security a list of those
organizations which by a final order of the Attorney General are
required to register as communist front organizations. Failure to
send this notice or failure to include any organization in the list
in any month will suspend the operation of subsection (b) of this
section during that month for those organizations to which notice
was not sent. In any case where an organization's classification as
a communist front organization is canceled, the ABC Board shall
immediately notify all persons in positions of security. It shall also be
the duty of the ABC Board to send every ninety days to all officers
and employees in positions of security a notification that such a
position has been classified as one of security.
(f) Notice required to be posted by subsection (b) (ii) of this
section shall be posted in a reasonable place and in a conspicuous
manner in all places where two or more government employees are
employed.
Section 15 (d). Any person violating § 6 of this Act shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000,
or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by both such
fine and imprisonment.
(e) In any case in which a conviction is not obtained for viola-
tion of § 6, all compensation withheld because of the alleged vio-
lation shall be paid to the defendant, even though during such time
his employment was suspended or terminated because of such
alleged violation.
III.. Communist Front Organizations
The success with which the internationalism of the "Communist Mani-
festo" has been fused with domestic social reform programs through
communist use of the "front organization" technique, merits serious
attention. This technique has not only achieved, to some extent, the
completely non-rational association of Russia's policies with such re-
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forms but has garnered both American dollars and adherents for carry-
ing out communist plans. Because many Americans might withdraw
their support if the organization's true nature and purposes were
disclosed, many have advocated the disclosure of such facts by a sys-
tem of compulsory registration.. of these organizations.
Registration, by placing duties and corresponding liabilities on the
group rather than directly on the individual, involves a comparatively
new approach in limiting civil liberties. But the objective of regis-
tration-to afford the public an opportunity to make a balanced judg-
ment of an organization's worth, by knowledge of its background and
connections-has been said to lie "implicitly at the heart of the tradi-
tional American form of government."' 1 This objective, however, can
only be achieved through compulsory registration enforced by criminal
sanctions; it would be naive to expect organizations to register them-
selves voluntarily as "subversive." Thus, a legislative technique of
direct control is used as a forerunner to a publicity program of an un-
veiling nature.
However, many objections can be made to any registration plan.
Not only may the registration of communist front organizations be felt
to lay down dangerous precedents for putting minority groups "beyond
the pale," but, because of the stigma attached, many individuals might
be reluctant to join, support, or remain in a registered organization.
Moreover, too broad a definition of a communist front organization may
act as a dragnet; even if such is not the case, effective enforcement
might require Herodian registrations. And the difficulties involved in
determining whether an organization is a communist front might mask
the personal vindictiveness of those entrusted with that determination.
But a registration plan drawn to meet these objections helps to re-
solve the fundamental dilemma with which this article began, as it
undermines the influence of communist organizations without involv-
ing their suppression.
Perhaps the first attack that legislation requiring registration of a
particular group must face is the claim that it constitutes a bill of
attainder. 2 It would seem that whether or not a definition of "com-
10 0Rep. Lucas, 94 Cong. Rec. 6267 (May 19, 1948); Sen. Taft, How Should Democracy
Deal with Groups Which Aimn to Destroy Democracy?, Town Meeting, May 18, 1948,
p. 7, col. 1. Some have proposed registration of all groups which attempt to influence
public opinion. PRESIDENT'S CO~M1TErE oN CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE TH SE RiG TS 164
(1947); New Yorker, June 12, 1948, p. 17.
'OSmith, Democratic Control of Propaganda Through Registration and Disclosure,
6 PuB. Op. Q. 27 (1942).
10 2See United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 66 Sup. Ct. 1073 (1946). In one attack
on the constitutionality of the Mundt-Nixon Bill this point was stressed most. NATioNAL
LAWYERs GuImD, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MUNDT-NixoN BILL (1948).
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munist front organization" would make the statute a bill of attainder,
because directed at "easily ascertainable members of a group,''103 is
less a question of law than it is one of draftsmanship. The rationale of
the requirement that legislation be of general applicability seemingly
is that proscription in general terms is in itself some measure of safety,
because when greater numbers are affected, they can amass more politi-
cal power in self-defense than could individuals."0 4 Moreover, a re-
quirement of proscription in general terms, setting down uniform
standards, prevents vindictive singling out of any one individual or
organization. 10 5
Thus, the definition must be broad enough to preclude being classi-
fied as a bill of attainder; 0 6 no due process attack on the grounds of
vagueness can be successfully maintained if the registration statute in-
flicts punishment only after an organization's non-compliance with a
judicial determination that it must register.
Though historically no enactment could be a bill of attainder unless
providing for capital punishment,107 American decisions have broad-
ened the area of penalties which will be considered "punishment."' 0 8
The publicity opprobrium, and possible loss of employment attendant to
the investigation of the House Un-American Activities Committee-all
of which may possibly follow compulsory registration-has been said
to constitute such punishment. 109 But it seems unlikely that the Supreme
Court will be ready to go this far, as then almost any legislation having
103 United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 315-16, 66 Sup. Ct. 1073, 1079 (1946). Most
statutes held invalid in the United States as bills of attainder have been directed at classes
rather than at individuals. See, e.g., Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866) (Confed-
erate lawyers); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1866); (Confederate priests);
In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 Fed. 437 (C. C. D. Ore. 1888) (Chinese laborers); Gaines v.
Buford, 1 Dana 481 (Ky. 1833) (landlords); see Note, 46 CoL. L. REV. 849 (1946).
'
0 4Because communist organizations currently have little political power in Congress,
and because they are particularly subject to vindictive action due to popular distaste for
them, the traditional test of a bill of attainder as being directed at an "easily ascertaina-
ble group" may possibly be dispensed with.
l05"With very few exceptions, the advocates of such laws were stimulated by ambi-
tion, or personal resentment, and vindictive malice. To prevent such and similar acts of
violence and injustice, I believe, the Federal and State legislatures, were prohibited from
passing any bill of attainder, or any ex post facto law." Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 389
(U. S. 1798).
'
0 GIn Revolutionary days, bills of attainder were frequent. See Pound, Justice Accord-
ing to Law, 14 COL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1914); Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the
American Revolution, 3 ILL. L. Rv. 81, 147 (1908).
'
0 7 See 16 LEGAL OBSERVER 305 (1838); Norville, Bill of Attainder-A Rediscovered
Weapon Against Discriminatory Legislation, 26 ORE. L. REv. 78 (1947); Note, 46 COL.
L. REv. 849 (1946); 33 VA. L. REv. 88 (1947).
'
0 8See Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1866); Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333 (U. S. 1866) (capital punishment not necessary). This trend was carried to the point
of considering as requisite punishment, permanent deprivation from federal employment.
United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 66 Sup. Ct. 1073 (1946).109See Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241, 254 (App. D. C. 1948) (dissenting
opinion).
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any direct deleterious effects on a named class could be construed as a
bill of attainder.'"
While not precisely analogous to a license requirement, the effect of
this registration is to require disclosure before further solicitation by
communist organizations. Such a condition precedent may well infringe
indirectly upon freedom of speech. The Supreme Court said in Thomas
v. Collins"' that "as a matter of principle, a requirement of registration
in order to make a public speech would seem generally incompatible
with an exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly.""' 2
But in cases of solicitation, it was once taken for granted that regis-
tration was a legitimate condition precedent, 113 however, the same
opinion indicates that solicitation and free speech are so inextricably
interwoven that here also registration cannot now be required. 114
On the other hand, it would seem that where the registration require-
ment has as its purpose something entirely independent of free speech
-as where it merely attempts to make supporters cognizant of their
association with communist organizations-the criminal sanctions ap-
plied for failure to register should be considered as a reasonable method
of enforcement only, and not as a condition precedent to solicitation.
Courts have read into the Fifth Amendment the guarantees of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth. 115 These guarantees, while
merely a limit on the power of making classifications in enactment of
regulatory legislation, may be highly relevant here because discrimination
against only communist organizations is the core of the registration pro-
visions. In determining the validity of such provisions, "a lack of
abstract symmetry does not matter;"' " 6 nor is a mere production of
inequality enough."' But, as has been previously shown," 8 the consti-
11OHowever, since the Bill's proponents may have intended these deleterious effects,
there may be grounds for a distinction.
111323 U. S. 516, 65 Sup. Ct. 315 (1945).
"121d. at 539, 65 Sup. Ct. at 327. See Notes, 33 GEO. L. J. 227 (1945), 43 fItcH. L.
REV. 1159 (1945).
113 "Without a doubt a state may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by
requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for
any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he
purports to represent." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 306, 60 Sup. Ct. 900,
904 (1940).
11 4Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 539, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 327 Z1945); see Note, 33
GEO. L. J. 227, 230 (1945); cf. American Federation of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90,
155 P. 2d 145 (1944).
115See note 68 supra.
116 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 144, 34 Sup. Ct. 281, 282 (1914).
117American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 71 Sup. Ct. 43 (1900).
"18 See note 66 supra. Congress may weigh relative needs and restrict the application
of a legislative policy to less than the entire field. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 396,
52 Sup. Ct. 581, 588 (1932). See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 400,
57 Sup. Ct. 578, 585 (1937); Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 226, 34 Sup. Ct.
856 (1914).
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tutionality of this classification will depend on whether or not the
court considers its purpose reasonably related to the legislation's ob-
jectives. Since the court has usually refused to look at whether or not
the classification is precisely limited to the objective," 9 this registra-
tion would seem to withstand the attack of "due process."
A trilogy of registration statutes, motivated by an attempt to bring
under "the pitiless spotlight of publicity" elements considered danger-
ous to democracy, has preceded the Mundt-Nixon Bill. The first, the
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,20 required propaganda agents
subsidized or directed from foreign sources,. to disclose that connec-
tion by registering as an agent of a foreign principal.' 2 ' As originally
enacted, the statute failed to provide criminal sanctions, and limited
disclosure to those directly engaged in political propaganda; subsequent
amendments have not materially helped. Moreover, the Act was in-
adequately enforced'22 and the information required of those who did
register was, at best, sketchy. The Alien Registration Act of 1940,1'
which tended to equate foreign birth with disloyalty, required all aliens
in the United States to furnish information concerning their activities.
However, its administration has not infringed upon civil liberties.'24
The Voorhis Act of 1940,125 by requiring registration of all domestic
subversive organizations, was primarily designed to supplement the
disclosure requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. But
it was so narrowly drawn that only organizations subject to foreign
control and engaged in either political or civilian military activity, or-
those indigenous organizations attempting to overthrow any govern-
ment by violence or engaged in both political and civilian military ac-
tivity, were required to register. The Act's ineffectiveness can be meas-
ured by the fact that not a single fascist or communist organization
registered under it.126
119E.g., Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 30 Sup. Ct. 676 (1910);
Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckenbach, 274 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 630 (1927).
12052 STAT. 631 (1938), as amended, 53 STAT. 1244 (1939), 22 U. S. C. §§ 611-21 (1946).
12 1"Thus the Foreign Agents Registration Act and the Voorhis Act may properly be
viewed as an extension to other groups of certain principles of honesty, responsibility, and
disclosure which have been applied for some years to users of Second Clasg Mails, sellers
of securities, federally regulated banks, candidates for public offices, holders of civil ser-
vice positions, and operators of radio stations." Smith, Democratic Control of Propaganda
Through Registration and Disclosure, 6 PuB. Op. Q. 27, 37 (1942).
122 1nstitute of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda: The Method of Ex-
posure, 10 U. or Cm. L. REv., 107, 113-22 (1943); cf. Clark, Hearings Before the Sub-
commitee on Un-American Activities on H. R. 4422 and H. R. 4581, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
22 (1948).
12354 STAT. 670 (1940), 8 U. S. C. §§ 451-60 (1946). See Note, 41 CoL. L. REv. 159 (1941).
12 4Institute of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda: The Method of Ex-
posure, 10 U. or Cmr. L. REv. 107, 136-38 (1943). But see CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH In T=E
UNr STATES 439-90 (1941).
12554 STAT. 1201 (1940), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 2386 (Supp. 1948).
12 6Foilowing enactment of the Voorhis Act, seven organizations registered under its
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The first impression that one draws from the definition of a com-
munist front organization found in § 3 (4) of the Mundt-Nixon
Bill is*one of vagueness. Use of words and phrases such as "substan-
tially all the ordinary and usual," "control," "'in general," and "reason-
able to conclude" points to the tremendous discretion which will reside
in the person or agency deciding whether an organization falls -under
this definition. Yet, since many limitations will arise subsequent to
registration, a precise definition, covering only the exact evil which is
sought to be prevented, would seem desirable.
In exempting from classification as communist fronts, organizations
having "substantially all the ordinary and usual" characteristics of a
political party, Congress apparently intended to except present "third
parties."'2T  Conceivably, communist fronts could convert themselves,
into miniscule political parties whose main planks would reflect the
particular reform on which the organization now allegedly rests. How-
ever, such a step would leave behind most persons now being duped,
because such persons neither would have faith in small splinter parties
nor would want to limit their political expressions to such narrow ob-
jectives. Moreover, such a step, by a political application of inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius, would divide the sources of support from
which communist fronts now draw. A mere change in name of the present
American Communist Party or a mass consolidation into a political
party of the existing communist fronts would fall under a definition of
"communist political organization." Therefore, the exclusion provided
by subsection (4) is wise, and because of the improbability that pres-
ent fronts will convert themselves into political parties, the exclusion
need not be hedged by ambiguous qualifications, but can be absolute.
In making an affirmative definition of the existence of a front, the
Bill includes any organization "(i) . . . under the control of a com-
munist political organization." The key lies in the word "control." In
light of the legislative objective of exposing-only those organizations
deceiving the public,s' "control" should be said to exist only when a
provisions. Five of these registered because they advocated violent overthrow of the Nazi
government; the other two because they advocated such overthrow of the Russian com-
munist regime.
127Rep. Nixon, 94 Cong. Rec. 6220 (May 19, 1948); Rep. Nixon, 94 Cong. Rec. 6175
(May 18, 1948); Rep. Rankin, 94 Cong. Rec. 5991 (May 14, 1948); Rep. Vorys, 94 Cong.
Rec. 6021 (May 14, 1948); Rep. Kersten, 94 Cong. Rec. 6027 (May 14, 1948). But cf.
Rep. Marcantonio, 94 Cong. Rec. 6176 (May 18, 1948).
12 SAt least one relevant problem is not faced by this subsection. It deals with the
possible existence of organizations clearly under clauses (i), (ii), or (iii) but which
cannot be said to dupe the American people. A suppositious example might be "The
Communist League for the Aid of the Communist Party." However, forcing such a group
to register may be necessary to achieve the effective registration of organizations which
also cannot be classified as communist political organizations.
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communist political organization makes policy determinations for the
organization. Anything less would amount only to influence and would
not result in the organization's consciously duping Americans., 29 The
presence of communist political organization members in places of au-
thority is, of course, strong evidence of communist control, but the
ultimate question in each case should be whether these members make
the policy determinations.
The Bill alternatively declares an organization to be a communist front
when "(ii) . .. it is primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid
and support to a communist political organization, communist foreign
government, or the world communist movement." Unless the definition
of a communist political organization member is stringent, it is diffi-
cult to visualize finding many organizations so operated without also
finding the communist strength requisite for "control" under clause (i).
Moreover, some organizations that might be held to fall under clause
(ii) but not under clause (i) may not be legitimate prey. For example,
may not the American Civil Liberties Union, if expending most of its
resources defending the recently indicted officers of the Communist
Party be, at that time, "primarily operated for the purpose of giving
aid and support to a communist political organization"? Therefore, in
order to avoid any such interpretation, clause (ii) should be limited to
organizations which are now and may reasonably be expected to con-
tinue to operate as indicated in that clause. However, this clause does
serve a useful function in possible cases which do not fall under clause
(i), and acts as an effective tool where communist direction of policy
determinations exists but cannot be proved.
The last alternative definition of a communist front is an organiza-
tion whose "views and policies are in general adopted because such
views or policies are those of a communist political organization, a com-
munist foreign government, or such world communist movement."
(Italics added.) The problem presented in proving this motivation
is practically insurmountable. Although an exact correlation between
the policies of an organization and that of any of the three listed con-
tacts would seem conclusive, the use of the qualifying words "in gen-
eral" might act as a dragnet for any liberal organization which has ever
criticized United States policy.3 This is true despite the saving clause
requiring that such criticism be the result of a causal relationship be-
12 9As originally introduced, the Bill provided that influence was sufficient. This test was
dropped in committee.
13 OSee Rep. Heselton, 94 Cong. Rec. 6262 (May 19, 1948); Rep. Murdock, 94 Cong.
Rec. 6263 (May 19, 1948); Rep. Buchanan, 94 Cong. Rec. 5998 (May 14, 1948).
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tween the avowedly communist source and the suspect organization.'
This third classification would seem to be more an aid to the proof of
the other two than it is an independent appraisal; as such it would
seem legitimate only where a high correlation exists.
The Bill provides that a suspect organization is a communist front
when "it is reasonable to conclude"' 32 that it falls within any of the
three definitions. Conceivably, under this requirement a preponderance
of evidence may be sufficient to prove that it is reasonable to believe
that an organization is a communist front; this is quite different from
the normal procedure of proving such actually to be the fact.
To aid determinations under the alternative definitions, four consid-
erationsl -"some or all of" which are to be looked to-are listed in
§ 3 (4). The use of the word "some" might indicate an option to con-
sider only those factors which show communist domination and to
ignore those same factors when they do not. 34 It would, then, seem
desirable to rephrase this clause. The first of the four considerations is:
"(A) The identity of the persons who are active in its management,
direction, or supervision, whether or not holding office therein." Though
it is a good idea not to limit this consideration to elective officers, as
communists frequently direct from appointive positions, the considera-
tion would seem too broadly phrased. Since any voting member might
be considered "active" in an organization's direction, such a clause
would invite investigation of the complete membership, something which
Congress intended to avoid elsewhere in the Bill. 85 Therefore, it would
seem desirable to limit this consideration to the identity of those having
any positions which involve executive or supervisory functions; this
would not detract from the value of the consideration, which was to
aid determination of the applicability of clause (i).
"(B) The sources from which an important part of its support, finan-
cial or otherwise, is derived," (Italics added.) The phrase "important
part" could refer as easily to weekly dues as it could to large contribu-
tions, thereby allowing investigation of all members. Thus, since this
consideration can have value in protecting the American public only as
indicating financial support above dues uniformly assessed and collected
13 1 See Rep. Nixon, 94 Cong. Rec. 6265 (May 19, 1948).
132 Rep. Holifield, 95 Cong. Rec. 6018 (May 14, 1948); Rep. Marcantonio, 94 Cong. Rec.
6179 (May 18, 1948).
133The testing of four considerations might make for a judicial application of the doc-
trine of inclusio unius est exciusio alterius. It would seem to be advisable to indicate that
these considerations are only typical, not exclusive.
134 Compare criticism of "some" as being too vague. Rep. Holifield, 94 Cong. Rec.
6018 (May 14, 1948).1 35Sec. 8 (3) and (4). See Rep. Nixon, 94 Cong. Rec. 6282 (May 19, 1948).
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or nominal contributions 136 from members of communist political or-
ganizations or communist foreign governments, the consideration should
be phrased to limit investigation to those sources.
"(C) The use made of its funds, resources, or personnel." This
consideration seems a relevant and necessary factor in determinations
under any of the alternative definitions.
"(D) The positions taken on or advanced by it from time to time
on matters of policy." (Italics added.) As indicated in the discussion
of clause (iii), this is a dangerous test unless the policy correlation
there discussed is high.13 7
Recommendations:
Section 3 (4). The term "communist front organization" means
any organization in the United States (other than a communist
political organization and other than an organization having the
characteristics of a political party) with respect to which, having
regard to the following typical considerations:
(A) the identity of the persons holding executive or super-
visory positions in it, whether elective or non-elective;
(B) the extent to which it derives support, financial or other-
wise, from members of communist political organizations or com-
munist foreign governments; provided that, all dries uniformly as-
sessed and collected, and contributions under twenty-five dollars
($25) shall not be considered as support;
(C) the use made by it of its funds, resources, or personnel; and
(D) the position from time to time taken or advanced by it on
matters of policy;
on a preponderance of evidence, it be found (i) that its policy
determinations are made by members of communist political or-
ganizations or (ii) that it is primarily operated for the purpose
of giving continual aid and support to a communist political
organization, a communist foreign government, or the world com-
munist movement; provided that, it cannot be shown that there
is an immediate prospect of change of such purpose; or (iii) that its
views and policies are consistently adopted and advanced because
such views and policies are those of a communist political organi-
zation, a communist foreign government, or such world communist
movement.
13 6There is a basic inconsistency in exposing to investigation those who give financial
support to front organizations, when one of the primary reasons advanced for the necessity
of this legislation is the protection of those very people.
13 7Originally, the Bill treated as an incident of communist tactics that of "disturbing
trade and commerce." It was felt that this might include those labor unions controlled
by communists. Rep. Sabath, 94 Cong. Rec. 5987 (May 14, 1948); Rep. Blatnik, 94 Cong.
Rec. 6033 (May 14, 1948); Rep. Norton, 94 Cong. Rec.- 6178 (May 18, 1948). However,
the proponents denied such coverage. Rep. Kersten, 94 Cong. Rec. 6027 (May 14, 1948).
The subsequent removal, on the floor, of this clause seems clearly indicative of Congres-
sional intent.
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Registration not only is the sole method of effective disclosure under
this legislative objective, but it serves to furnish a constitutional basis
for the entire bill. If no registration requirement were provided, the
bill would demand no affirmative action by the Attorney General
against the organization. Only the opportunity to appeal his order to
register before it becomes final will provide the suspect organization
with the right of some judicial review. This review would seem to be
required by the Constitution because of the affirmative duties and re-
sultant criminal sanctions for non-compliance placed upon such an
organization. Analysis of the information required by the registra-
tion provisions of subsections (d) and (e) of § 8 must rest first
on the extent to which the information required by those sub-
sections fulfills the inquiries of the listed considerations, pre-
viously discussed, which test the existence of a communist front. Second,
the desirability of these disclosure requirements is inversely proportional
to the extent that the required information extends beyond those con-
siderations.
Requirements (1) and (2) of subsection (d) requiring the filing of
the name of the organization and its officers are mostly perfunctory. The
latter could add more to consideration (A) of § 3 (4) were it to
specify that the list include the names of all executive and supervisory
officers, whether elective or non-elective. On the other hand, require-
ment (3), by compelling the listing of all money received or spent,
together with a record of its source or purpose, would include every
member of a dues-collecting communist front organization. To comply
more accurately with consideration (B), as revised, the requirement of
listing sources should be limited to those making contributions over
twenty-five dollars, excluding normal dues. Moreover, requirements
(2) and (3) of subsection (d) by compelling disclosure of informa-
tion concerning the preceding twelve months would seem to grate against
the section's legislative objective of protecting innocent persons. It
would seem sufficient to limit disclosure to activities subsequent to the
registration order, to be made by supplemental annual reports as pro-
vided in subsection (e). But in the main these requirements achieve the
legislative goal and go far beyond the sketchy registration provisions
of the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
Recommendations:
Section 8 (d). The registration made under subsection (a) or (b)
[by a communist front or a communist political organization]
shall be accompanied by a registration statement, to be prepared
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and filed in such manner and form as the Attorney General shall by
regulations prescribe, containing the following information:
(1) the name of the organization,
(2) the name and last-known address of each individual who
is at the time of the filing of such registration statement, an execu-
tive or supervisory officer, whether elective or non-elective,
(3) an accounting, in such form and detail as the Attorney Gen-
eral shall by regulations prescribe, of all moneys received and ex-
pended (including the sources from which received and the pur-
poses for which expended) from the time of the registration to
the date that such organization registers; provided that, such
accounting shall not list the sources of such funds received by a
communist front organization from all dues uniformly assessed
and collected, and cumulative contributions of less than twenty-
five dollars ($25) per registration period.
(e) It shall be the duty of each organization registered under
this section to file with the Attorney General on or before February
1 of the year following the year in which it registers, and on or
before February 1 of each succeeding year, an annual report, pre-
pared and filed in such manner and form as the Attorney General
shall by regulations prescribe, containing the same information
which by subsection (d) is required to be included in a registra-
tion statement except that no information shall be required under
(1), (2) or (3) of subsection (d) of any period prior to the date
of the final order of the Attorney General requiring such organiza-
tion to register.
(f) It shall be the duty of each communist-political organization
registered under this section to keep, in such manner and form
as the Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe-
(1) accurate records of the names and addresses of the mem-
bers of such organization and
(2) accurate records and accounts of moneys received and ex-
pended (including the sources from which received and the pur-
poses for which expended) by such organization. (Words in italics
added to Bill.)
(g) In the case of failure on the part of any organization to
register or to file any registration statement or annual report as
required by this section, it shall be the duty of the executive offi-
cer (or individual performing the ordinary and usual duties of an
executive officer) and of the secretary (or individual performing
the ordinary and usual duties of a secretary) of such organization,
and of such officer or officers of such organization as the Attorney
General shall by regulations prescribe, to register for such organi-
zation, to file such registration statement, or to file such annual
report, as the case may be.
The Bill, in § 15 (a), provides that after the Attorney General's
order requiring registration becomes final, each day's failure to regis-
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ter constitutes, whether on the part of the organization or the respon-
sible individual, a separate offense. Thus in one month fines from
$60,000 to $150,000 could be levied, or imprisonment from 60 to 150
years could result, or both such fines and imprisonments could be levied.
Seemingly, the purpose of this provision is to prevent the organization's
exemption from registration requirements after one conviction. Although
this provision has been challenged as a "cruel and unusual punish-
ment,' 1 88 and although a statute's degree of punishment, as well as
mode, can be judicially condemned,' 39 despite little Supreme Court au-
thority it is doubtful whether § 15 (a) shocks the public sensibility to
the requisite degree. But since the objective of adequate enforcement
can be accomplished without the severity this section provides, it
would seem desirable to make cumulative penalties take effect only
every three months.
IV. Disclosure of the Origin of Propaganda
Disclosing the names of communist organizations to the public is
not sufficient, for, as often has been the case in the past, they could
produce their propaganda without divulging the source from which it
came.
Most of us believe that no matter how despicable the views of
others may seem, the right to express these views should not be chal-
lenged. The validity of a position does not depend upon the identity of
the person taking it, but rather on an independent evaluation after
sufficient research. But as a practical matter, this independent de-
termination is in most cases impossible, and in making judgments we
are continually influenced by the source from which statements emanate.
Moreover, anonymity aids the heretofore discussed association whih
can be made between specific social reforms which many Americans
may favor and the policy of a foreign government.14
In light of the Soviet allegiance of American communists, the exten-
sive degree to which they use the technique of concealment, and the
success that they have had in influencing public opinion by this tech-
nique, a requirement of disclosure would seem to be justified. 4' This
disclosure would greatly diminish their influence, not because of gov-
ernment suppression, but rather because of public recognition of their
interests. Although it is true. that some methods of achieving disclosure
'
3 8Rep. Holifield, 94 Cong. Rec. 6261 (May 19, 1948); Rep. Celler, 94 Cong. Rec.
6261 (May 19, 1948).
13 9Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 30 Sup. Ct. 544 (1910).
'4OSee note 27 mpra.
141See note 28 supra.
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may infringe upon freedom of expression, the objective of putting the
spotlight on communist propaganda does not limit that liberty, but
adds to the relevant facts in the market-place of competing ideas.
It seems clear that in order to disclose adequately the source of com-
munist propaganda, it is necessary to include not only the material
disseminated or sponsored by the central communist political organi-
zation, but also that circulated by communist front organizations. This
is true not only to prevent the circumvention of any disclosure require-
ments by the simple means of setting up a puppet propaganda organi-
zation, but also because it is through these organizations that com-
munists have been able to mask the origin of their propaganda most
effectively. 42
:ven though the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
includes the power to prohibit, 4 ' and the motive of Congress in util-
izing the commerce clause would now eem irrelevant,144 this power is
subject to the limitations prescribed in the Bill of Rights. 45 Although,
seemingly, control of foreign commerce would be limited to the same
extent, a difficulty arises from the fact that, as regards foreign com-
merce, the Federal Government has derived power not merely from the
commerce clause but from its exclusive control over foreign relations.146
This factor, it might be argued, would raise a political question which
the courts would lack "jurisdiction" to decide 47 But although such a
consideration might weigh in a decision's outcome, it is doubtful whether
a court would refuse to decide the validity of a statute, involving the
First Amendment, on a mere assumption that the legislation was justi-
fied by considerations of foreign affairs.
The most serious question concerning the limitations placed on our
government by the First Amendment arises in congressional exercise of
the postal power.' 48 The first important case in the field, Ex parte
Jackson,149 involved a statutory prohibition against lottery circulars in
1 4 2E.g., CHAIMER OF COMMiERCE, COMUMNIST INxILTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 14-15
(1946); see note 28 supra.
14 3E.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913); Champion v.
Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321 (1903); ROTTSCHAsER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 239
(1939).
14 4E.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451 (1941); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 63 Sup. Ct. 82 (1942).
14 5E.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103, 57 Sup. Ct. 650 (1937); Railroad Re-
tirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 758 (1935); see VANe CoTT, CoN-
sTIruTiONAL LAW 108 (1948); Phillips, The Growth and Development of the Federal
Commerce Power, 11 TEM. L. Q. 517 (1937).1 4 6WILLOUGHBy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 576 (2d ed. 1929).
'47Cf. Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118, 32 Sup. Ct.
224 (1912).
14 8U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8.
14996 U. S. 727 (1878).
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the mails. The Court, instead of dealing with the case on the basis
of an absorbed police power contained in the postal clause, based its
decision on the ground that the Amendment is not applicable where Con-
gress did not prohibit the circulation of material by other means. In
light of the federal monopoly over the mails'50 and the economic im-
practicability of circulating publications in any other manner, 5' this
basis for the decision is extremely dubious. This becomes even more
obvious when, in 1903, the Court, in a case dealing also with lottery
circulars,5 s read a "federal police power" into the commerce clause 53
thus blocking the so-called "other media."
Although this "other media" theory was at times reiterated, 4 most
of the succeeding cases placed their decisions on the basis that the Gov-
ernment was acting in a proprietary capacity, 55 and therefore the use
of the mails was a privilege upon which Congress "may annex such
conditions as it chooses."' 5 Despite the fact that all these earlier
cases 57 could have been decided on a legitimate exercise of police power,
the privilege rationale applied in some of them was later carried over
to cases dealing with the intellectual content of matter sent through
the mails.' 58 But the extension of this rationale was met with vigorous
dissents by Justices Holmes and Brandeis,'59 who claimed that "The
50 REv. STAT. § 3829 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 1729 (Supp. 1948).
15ISee Mr. justice Holmes, dissenting, Leach v. Carlile, 258 U. S. 138, 141, 47 Sup.
Ct. 227, 229 (1922); Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the Mails, 36 McH. L. REv.
703, 732 (1938); see Legis., 38 COL. L. REV. 474, 477-78 (1938); Note, 28 VA. L. Rv.
634, 641 (1942).
15 2 Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321 (1903).
'
5 3See, e.g., Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 299 U. S. 334, 347,
57 Sup. Ct. 277, 280 (1937); Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325, 36 Sup. Ct. 131 (1915);
Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
States, 220,U. S. 45, 31 Sup. Ct. 364 (1911) ; see Note, 42 COL. L. Rav. 1333, 1334 (1942).
15 41n re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110, 12 Sup. Ct. 374 (1892); Perlman and Ploscowe, False
Defamatory Anti-racial and Anti-religious Propaganda and the Use of the Mqils, 4 LAW.
GuILD REv. 13 (1944).
'
5 5See Legis., 38 COL. L. REv. 474, 478 (1938); Note, 45 MIcH. L. Rxv. 230, 232 (1946).1 5 6Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 506, 24 Sup. Ct. 789, 793 (1904);
see Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288, 33 Sup. Ct. 867 (1913); Gitlow v.
Kiely, 44 F. 2d 227 (S. D. N. Y. 1930), aff'd, 49 F. 2d 1077 (C.'C. A. 2d 1931), cert. denied,
284 U. S. 648, 52 Sup. Ct. 29 (1931); Warren v. United States, 183 Fed. 718 (C. C. A.
8th 1910).1 57 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 789 (1904) (fraud
order); In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110, 12 Sup. Ct. 374 (1892) (lottery ad in newspaper);
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1878) (lottery circular); Warren v. United States, 183
Fed. 718 (C. C. A. 8th 1910) (defamatory envelope).
15SUnited States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255
U. S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct. 352 (1921); Gitlow v. Kiely, 44 F. 2d 227 (S. D. N. Y. 1930),
aff'd, 49 F. 2d 1077 (C. C A. 2d 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 648, 52 Sup. Ct. 29 (1931);
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 2d 1917); Burleson v. United
States ex rel. Workingmen's Cooperative Publishing Ass'n, 274 Fed. 749 (App. D. C. 1921),
dismissed per stipulation, 260 U. S. 757, 43 Sup. Ct. 94 (1923).
15 9Leach v. Carlile, 258 U. S. 138, 42 Sup. Ct. 227 (1922); United States ex rel. Mil-
waukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct. 352
(1921); see Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466, 494, 40 Sup. Ct. 259, 269 (1920).
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United States may give up the post office when it sees fit, but while it
carries it on, the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech
as the right to use our tongues." 160 In light of the re-establishment of
the "clear and present danger" rule'0 and the extent to which recent
decisions have gone in order to protect freedom of expression, 6 ' the Gov-
ernment's power over the mails would seem to be restricted by the
First Amendment to the same extent as in control of speech. 63
Although today many statutes forbid the transmission of certain ma-
terials through commerce under the "federal police power,"'0 4 a statute
which prohibited material of a prescribed political nature would still
have to fall within the clear and present danger rule. Even under this
rule statutes prohibiting the transmission of material advocating treason
or insurrection,-1e or circulation of matter which aids in the obtaining 66
or disclosing 6 ' of information affecting the national defense, or dis-
semination of seditious material in time of war,168 would seemingly be
'
60 Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic
Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 437, 41 Sup. Ct. 352, 363 (1921); see ROGERS,
PosTAL PowER OF CONGRESS 178 (1916) (use of post office a matter of right). Even if it
is considered a privilege, to say that Congress can condition its grant so as to reduce the
guarantees of a free press, seems very doubtful. See Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions,
77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 879 (1929); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional
Rights, 35 COL. L. REv. 321 (1935); Kadin, Administrative Censorship: A Study of the
Mails, Motion Pictures and Radio Broadcasting, 19 B. U. L. REi. 533, 548 (1939);
Legis., 38 COL. L. R v. 474, 489 (1938).
For a very short but excellent analysis on the due process limitation of the postal power,
concluding that even though use of the mails has been classified as a privilege, a reasonable
relationship test must be satisfied, see Legis., 38 CoL. L. Rlv. 474, 490 (1938); also
RoTTscHAFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 180 (1939).
161E.g., Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 66 Sup. Ct. 1029 (1946); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 65 Sup. Ct. 315 (1944); Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 62
Sup. Ct. 190 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940). But cf.
Hoar, Subversive Activities Against Government--Two Conflicting Doctrines, 27 MARQ.
L. REV. 72 (1943).
162E.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444 (1936); Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931). See the very strong
protective language used in Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 62 Sup. Ct. 190 (1941).
'16 31n Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U. S. 146, 156, 66 Sup. Ct. 456, 461 (1946), the
Court said, "But grave constitutional questions are immediately raised once it is said that
the use of the mails is a privilege which may be extended or withheld on any grounds
whatsoever." See WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNiTED STATES § 656
(2d ed. 1929); Comment, 53 YALE L. J. 733, 743 (1944); Legis., 38 COL. L. REv. 474,
487 (1938).
16 4Mails: obscene matter, libelous and indecent matter, lotteries, promotion of fraud,
intoxicating liquors, poisons or explosives, etc..
Commerce: white-slave traffic, prize fight films, stolen vehicles, illegally killed game, etc.
See, in general, in 18 U. S. C. (Supp. 1948), those sections which formerly were 18
U. S. C. §§ 301-412 (1946).
16540 STAT. 230 (1917), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 1717 (Supp. 1948).
16 61bid., making non-mailable, violations of 40 STAT. 217 (1917), 50 U. S. C. § 31 (1946).
16740 STAT. 230 (1917), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 1717 (Supp. 1948), making non-
mailable violations of 40 STAT. 218 (1917), 50 U. S. C. § 32 (1946).
16840 STAT. 219 (1917), as amended, 41 STAT. 1359 (1921), 50 U. S. C. § 33 (1946),
made non-mailable by 40 STAT. 230 (1917), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 1717 (Supp.
1948). For a discussion of the full extent of censorship power during the war, see Price,
Censorship and Free Speech, 18 IND. L. J. 17 (1942).
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constitutional on their face. But as to the application of these statutes
to given facts, "the question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
[the government] has a right to prevent.' 1  On the other hand, a
statute prohibiting from interstate or foreign commerce or through the
mails the transmission of expression originating from specified sources
would clearly be unconstitutional. The rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment cover distribution as well as publication;170 and no matter
what past experiehce has shown about the dangerous views expressed
by a particular source, the cornerstone of the First Amendment is the
elimination of prior restraints.
The Mundt-Nixon Bill in § 11 (1) makes it unlawful for an organi-
zation, once that organization has been determined to be a communist
organization, to transmit any publication either in interstate or foreign
commerce or through the mails without labeling both the publication
and its container. This label must indicate that the publication is dis-
seminated by a communist organization whose name must also appear.
As the applicability of this subsection is determined not by the nature
of the material sent but by the identity of the sender, if the provision
constitutes a restraint on free speech, it will probably be held unconsti-
tutional as a prior restraint, without regard to whether particular ma-
terial represents a clear and present danger.
Although the Bill does not prohibit the circulation of this material, it
does attach a condition upon its dissemination. The performance of this
condition, which requires labeling also on the outside of the material's
container, will deter not merely the sender from publishing, but because
of the public stigma attached, will also deter the consumer from receiv-
ing. However, just as newspapers are required by law to distinguish
clearly between news and advertising columns in order to prevent
fraud,'172 it might be argued that the condition here is merely to prevent
a similar fraud being perpetrated by non-disclosure of the source. 7 8
1609(Italics added.) Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 Sup. Ct. 247, 249 (1919).
17 0E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 509, 68 Sup. Ct. 665, 667 (1948); Lovell
v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938).
171See, e.g., Mr. justice Holmes dissenting, in United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social
Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 437, 41 Sup. Ct. 352, 363 (1921);
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931); Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 27 Sup. Ct. 556 (1907); 4 COOLEY'S BLACKSTONE 151 (1871); 2
SToRy, CONSTiTuTION § 1880 (1836). But see Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the
Mails, 36 MIcEr. L. R v. 703, 714-15 (1938).1 7 2E.g., 37 STAT. 553, 554 (1912), as amended, 47 STAT. 1486 (1933), 39 U. S. C. §§ 233,
234 (1946); cf. Wis. STAT. §§ 12.12, 12.14 (1945) (political ads).
178"The public interest in a free press does not necessarily run counter to requirements
which mean that adequate information is to be furnished on the basis of which the
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In any case the Bill might be unconstitutional, for it has been repeatedly
stated that in legislation which involves the First Amendment the statute
"must be narrowly drawn to meet the precise evil the legislation seeks
to curb." 1 4 The Bill in requiring labeling on the publication's "envelope,
wrapper, or other container" does not bring about any additional dis-
closure to the consumer, but does act as a deterrent to the sending and
the receiving of these publications. It would seem that if the substan-
tive evils sought to be prevented are concealment from and fraud upon
the consumer, such disclosure should only be required in a place where
it can reasonably be calculated to be brought to the reader's attention.
Such disclosure seems to deal adequately with the evil while not sub-
stantially affecting enforcement."" Moreover, this disclosure would not
reduce the buyer's freedom to sell his ideas on the market" to those who
desire to purchase.
Any attempt to place conditions on the nature of material sent rather
than upon the sender would probably, even were it to pass the clear
and present danger test,17 6 be too vague to enforce with criminal sanc-
tions. 7  Without these sanctions little could be accomplished in achiev-
ing this legislative objective.
The Mundt-Nixon Bill in § 11 (2) prohibits communist or political
front organizations from radio broadcasting 7 unless the broadcast is
public can value the accuracy and bias of opinions published in newspapers." Deutsch,
Freedom of the Press and of the Mails, 36 MicH. L. REv. 703, 740 (1938); see Institute'
of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda: Method of Exposure, 10 U. or Cnr.
L. REv. 107 (1943); cf. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288, 33 Sup. Ct. 867
(1913).
It should be noted here that the protection even as to previous restraint has been recog-
nized to be not absolutely unlimited. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697,
51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931); see Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 438,
31 Sup. Ct. 492, 497 (1911).
17 4 United States v. C. I. 0., 335 U. S. 106, 141, 68 Sup. Ct. 1349, 1367 (1948). See
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 110, 67 Sup. Ct. 556, 574 (1947); Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940).
17 5 The types of material which are sent to "innocent" consumers, thus making dis-
closure desirable, can easily be obtained through the mail by any person desiring to en-
force this section. And although the Fourth Amendment protects the mails from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, a distinction seems to have been drawn "between what
is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, and sealed packages subject
to letter postage; and what is open to inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pam-
phlets and other printed matter, purposely left in a condition to be examined." Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 733 (1878); WLOUGHBY, CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW op THE UNITED
STATEs § 657 (2d ed. 1929).
176-1 . . it must necessarily be found, as an original question, that the specified publica-
tions involved created such likelihood of bringing about the substantive evil as to deprive
[them] of the constitutional protection." (Italics added.) Bridges v. California, 314 U. S.
252, 261, 62 Sup. Ct. 190, 193 (1941).
177 The authors were unable to formulate, in a criminal statute, a definition which could
withstand a due process attack on the grounds of vagueness.
178 "In any realistic approach to the problem of an American radio policy, it must be
recognized that there does not exist in this country any such thing as freedom of the air."
Note, 39 CoL. L. REv. 447 (1939). By making license renewal depend upon program
content or specific acts, the FCC practically exercises a restraint which has been called the
"censorship of fear." Kassner, Radio Censorship, 8 Am L. REv. 98 (1937); Siegel, Cen-
sorship in Radio, 7 AR L. REV. 1 (1936); see Notes, 47 CoL. L. REv. 1041 (1947), 54
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
preceded by both sponsor's name and the fact that such sponsor is a
communist organization. This requirement would seem to raise consti-
tutional questions similar to those, discussed in reference to freedom
of the press. However, it does seem that the prior restraint on the con-
suming audience here is no greater, and probably is less, than where
disclosure is required only within the publication.' 9 But any real neces-
sity for this provision, which was not contained in the original Bill, 8 '
seems to be lacking. Communists have made only slight use of radio
facilities, and sponsorship by front organizations is negligible. In those
cases where programs have been sponsored, the sources have usually
been disclosed, either by communist volition, or general FCC regulations,
or practice of the station. This being the case, it would seem undesira-
ble to draft a statute which in any event will raise serious constitu-
tional issues, when the desired result may be achieved by familiarizing
the public with those organizations that have been required to register
under the Act.
Certain undesirable clauses are present in § 11 of the Mundt-
Nixon Bill which it would seem well to change. The Bill speaks in sub-
section (1) of-
"... any publication which is intended to be, or which it is reason-
ble to believe is intended to be, circulated or disseminated among
two or more persons, unless such publication ... bears the follow-
ing. . . ." (Italics added.)
In the context in which the first "publication" is used it would seem
to mean any article published for the consumption of more than one
person. However, as used in the latter part of the sentence "publica-
tion" must mean any individual copy of that article because the label-
ing of which it speaks can refer only to single copies. This is made
clear by § 3 (6) which defines publication to mean "any circular, news-
paper, pamphlet, book, letter, postcard, leaflet, or other publication."
Thus, as "publication" means each individual copy, the use of the
singular form will create doubt in many cases whether or not any
given copy was intended to be circulated among two or more persons.
H~Av. L. REv. 1220 (1941). For the Commission's right to deny a license on the basis
of public interest when challenged as a violation of the First Amendment, see Trinity
Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F. 2d 850 (App. D. C. 1932).
See the rather "interesting contention" once made by the FCC that broadcast speech
is not within the First Amendment because the audience only hears an electrical reproduc-
tion of the original speech. Caldwell, Radio: The Fifth Estate, Freedom of Speech and
Radio Broadcasting, '177 ANNALS 182 (1935).
For the basis of federal control of radio, see McManus, Federal Legislation Regulating
Radio, 20 So. CA=. L. Rav. 146 (1947); 9 AiR. L. REv. 81 (1938).
179This would seem true as such disclosure over the radio would have but negligible
deterrent effect on those who wanted to listen to the program.
18OThe provision as to disclosure over the radio was added to the Bill in committee.
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A second objection is that such coverage includes "letters"; this may
mean that a personal letter intended for a man and his wife would be
subject to such conditions. The ambiguous catch-all phrase of "reason-
able to believe is intended to be" does little to remove the effect of this
poor draftsmanship. Certainly this whole clause, as part of a criminal
statute, runs the risk of a challenge of vagueness, and may thus result
in the whole section's unconstitutionality.
The section also makes it unlawful "for any person acting for or on
behalf of such organization to transmit or cause to be transmitted"'81
any article without the required labeling. If literally construed, this
results in an outrageous criminal coverage of innocent agents, includ-
ing mere delivery boys or carriers, since the provision does not require
knowledge either as to the type of organization involved or as to whether
it has complied with the disclosure provision. It would seem sufficient
to limit criminal punishment under § 15 (c) to officers and managers
of the defaulting communist organization.
Recommendations:
Section 11 (1). It shall be unlawful for any organization which
is registered under § 8, or for any organization with respect to which
there is in effect a final order of the Attorney General requiring it
to register
(a) to transmit or cause to be transmitted, through the United
States mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate or
foreign commerce, any newspaper, book, pamphlet, circular,
leaflet, periodical, magazine, or any other like printed matter,
unless it contains the following, printed once (to be reasonably
calculated to disclose the information to the reader) as may be pro-
vided in regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, with
the name of the organization appearing in lieu of the blank: "Dis-
seminated by , a communist organization";
(b) subsection (1) shall only take effect sixty days after the
Attorney General has sent to the main office of an organization
required to conform to that section a registered letter setting
forth the regulations he has prescribed according to that section.
Section 15 (f). Any director, officer, or manager of an organi-
zation which has violated the provisions of § 11 shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than $5000, or by im-
prisonment for not more than two years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
18 1The mail fraud statute, REv. STAT. § 5480 (1875), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 1341
(Supp. 1948) formerly read "place, or cause to be placed." This was construed to in-
dude agents, partners, accomplices, and those who set the letter in motion and could
reasonably foresee that it would be mailed. See 21 AINl. L. REv. 342 (1937).The Reviser's
Note to 18 U. S. C. § 1341 (Supp. 1948) states: "A reference to causing to be placed
any letter, etc. in any post office, or station thereof, etc. was omitted as unnecessary
because of definition of 'principal' in section 2 of this title." 35 STAT. 1152 (1909), as
amended, 18 U. S. C. § 2 (b) (Supp. 1948).
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APPENDIX
Extracts from the Mundt-Nixon Bill, H. R. 5852,
80th Congress, 2d Session (1948)
§ 1. SHORT TITLE.
§ 2. NECESSITY FOR LEGISLATION.
§ 3. DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of this Act-
(3) The term "communist political organization" means any organization in the
United States having some, but not necessarily all, of the ordinary and usual characteris-
tics of a political party, with respect to which, having regard to some or all of the follow-
ing considerations:
(A) the extent and nature of its activities, including the expression of views and
policies,
(B) the extent to which its policies are formulated and carried out and its activi-
ties performed, pursuant to directives or to effectuate the policies, of the foreign gov-
ernmental or political organization in which is vested, or under the domination or
control of which is exercised, the direction and control of the world communist
movement referred to in section 2 of this Act,
(C) the extent to which its views and policies are the same as those of such foreign
government or foreign organization,
(D) the extent to which it supports or advocates the basic principles and tactics
of communism as expounded by Marx and Lenin,
(E) the extent to which it receives financial or other aid, directly or indirectly,
from or at the direction of such foreign government or foreign organization,
(F) the extent to which it sends members or representatives to any foreign country
for instruction or training in the principles, policies, strategy, or tactics of such world
communist movement,
(G) the extent to which it reports to such foreign government or foreign organi-
zation or to its representatives,
(H) the extent to which its members or leaders are subject to or recognize the
disciplinary power of such foreign government or foreign organization or its repre-
sentatives,
(I) the extent to which (i) it fails to disclose, or resists efforts to obtain informa-
tion as to, its membership (by keeping membership lists in code, by instructing mem-
bers to refuse to acknowledge membership, or by any other method) ; (ii) its members
refuse to acknowledge membership therein; (iii) it fails to disclose, or resists efforts
to obtain information as to, records other than membership lists; (iv) its meetings are
secret; and (v) it otherwise operates on a secret basis, and
(J) the extent to which its members consider the allegiance they owe to the
United States as subordinate to their obligations to such foreign government or for-
eign organization,
it is reasonable to conclude (i) that it is under the control of such foreign government
or foreign governmental or political organization, or (ii) that it is one of the principal in-
strumentalities utilized by the world communist movement in carrying out its objectives.
(4) The term "communist-front organization" means any organization in the United
States (other than a communist political organization and other than an organization
having substantially all the ordinary and usual characteristics of a political party) with
respect to which, having regard to some or all of the following considerations:
.(A) the identity of the persons who are active in its management, direction, or
supervision, whether or not holding office therein,
(B) the sources from which an important part of its support, financial or other-
wise, is derived,
(C) the use made by it of its funds, resources, or personnel, and
(D) the position taken or advanced by it from time to time on matters of
policy,
it is reasonable to conclude (i) that it is under the control of a communist political
organization, or (ii) that it is primarily operated for the purpose of giving aid and sup-
port to a communist political organization, a communist foreign government, or the world
communist movement referred to in section 2, or (lii) that its views and policies are in
general adopted and advanced because such views or policies are those of a communist
political organization, a communist foreign government, or such world communist move-
ment.
(5) The term "communist organization" means a communist political organization
or a communist-front organization.
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(6) The term "publication" means any circular, newspaper, periodical, pamphlet, book,
letter, postcard, leaflet, or other publication....
(9) The term "final order of the Attorney General" means an order issued by the
Attorney General under section 13 of this Act, which has become final as provided in
section 14 of this Act, requiring an organization to register under section 8 of this Act as
a communist political organization or a communist-front organization.
§ 4. CERTAIN PaoniBiTED ACTs. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) To attempt in any manner to establish in the United States a totalitarian
dictatorship the direction and control of which is to be vested in, or exercised by or
under the domination or control of, any foreign government, foreign organization,
or foreign individual;
(2) To perform or attempt to perform any act with intent to facilitate or aid in
bringing about the establishment in the United States of such a totalitarian dic-
tatorship;
(3) Actively to participate in the management, direction, or supervision of any
movement to establish in the United States such a totalitarian dictatorship;
(4) Actively' to participate in the management, direction, or supervision of any
movement to facilitate or aid in bringing about the establishment in the United
States of such a totalitarian dictatorship;
.(5) to conspire to do anything made unlawful by this subsection.
(b)Any person who violates any of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section
shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or im-
prisonment for not more than 10 years, or both such fine and imprisonment.
(c) Any offense punishable under this section may be prosecuted at any time without
regard to any statute of limitations.
§ 5. Loss OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP. (a) Section 401 of the Nationality Act of
1940, as amended, is hereby amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and
inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and the word "or", and by adding at the end of such
section a new subsection to read as follows:
"(k) Committing any violation of section 4 of the Subversive Activities Control Act,
1948, provided he is convicted thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction."
(b) Section 403 (a) of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended, is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (g), (h), (i), or (k) of section 401, no
national can expatriate himself, or be expatriated, under such section while within
the United States or any of its outlying possessions, but expatriation shall result from
the performance within the United States or any of its outlying possessions of any
of the acts or the fulfillment of any of the conditions specified in such section if and
when the national thereafter takes up a residence abroad."§ 6. EMPLOYMENT OF MEMBERS oF CoMMuNIST POITICAL ORGANxzATIONs. (a) It shall
be unlawful for any member of a communist political organization, knowing or believing, or
having reasonable grounds for knowing or believing, that the organization is a com-
munist political organization-
(1) to seek or accept any, office or employment under the United States without
revealing that he is a member of such organization; or
(2) after thirty days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to hold any non-
elective office or employment under the United States.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States to appoint or
employ any individual as an officer or employee of the United States, knowing or believ-
ing that such individual is a member of a communist political organization.§ 7. DENIAL OF PASSPORTS TO MEMBERS OF COMMUNIST POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any member of a communist political organization, knowing
or believing, or having reasonable grounds for knowing or believing, that the organization
is a communist political organization-
(1) to make application for a passport, or the renewal of a passport, to be issued
or renewed by or under the authority of the United States; or
(2) after sixty days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to use or attempt
to use a passport theretofore issued.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States to issue a
passport to, or renew the passport of, any individual knowing or believing that such indi-
vidual is a member of a communist political organization.
§ 8. REGISTRATION AND ANNUAL REPORTS OF COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS. (a) Each com-
munist political organization (including any organization required, by a final order
of the Attorney General, to register as a communist political organization) shall, within
the time specified in subsection (c) of this section, register with the Attorney General,
on a form prescribed by him by regulations, as a communist political organization.
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(b) Each communist-front organization (including any organization required, by a
final order of the Attorney General, to register as a communist-front organization) shall,
within the time specified in subsection (c) of this section, register with the Attorney
General, on a form prescribed by him by regulations, as a communist-front organization.
(c) The registration required by subsection (a) or (b) shall be made-
(1) in the case of an organization which is a communist political organization or a
communist-front organization on the date of the enactment of this Act, within thirty
days after such date;
(2) in the case of an organization becoming a communist political organization or
a communist-front organization after the date of the enactment of this Act, within
thirty days after such organization becomes a communist political organization or a
communist-front organization, as the case may be; and
(3) in the case of an organization which by a final order of the Attorney General
is required to register, within thirty days after such order becomes final.
(d) The registration made under subsection (a) or (b) shall be accompanied by a
registration statement, to be prepared and filed in such manner and form as the Attorney
General shall by regulations prescribe, containing the following information:
(1) The name of the organization.
(2) The name and last-known address of each individual who is at the time of
the filing of such registration statement, and of each individual who was at any time
during the period of twelve full calendar months preceding the filing of such state-
ment, an officer of the organization, with the designation or title of the office so
held, and with a brief statement of the duties and functions of such individual as
such officer.
(3) An accounting, in such form and detail as the Attorney General shall by regu-
lations prescribe, of all moneys received and expended (including the sources from
which received and the purposes for which expended) by the organization during the
period of twelve full calendar months preceding the filing of such statement.
(4) In the case of a communist political organization, the name and last-known
address -of each individual who was a member of the organization at any time
during the period of twelve full calendar months preceding the filing of such state-
ment.
(e) It shall be the duty of each organization registered under this section to file with
the Attorney General on or before February 1 of the year following the year in which it
registers, and on or before February 1 of each succeeding year, an annual report, pre-
pared and filed in such manner and form as the Attorney General shall by regulations pre-
scribe, containing the same information which by subsection (d) is required to be in-
cluded in a registration statement, except that the information required with respect to
the twelve-month period referred to in paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of such subsection shall,
in such annual report, be given with respect to the calendar year preceding the February 1
on or before which such annual report must be filed.
(f) It shall be the duty of each organization registered under this section to keep,
in such manner and form as the Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe-
(1) accurate records of the names and addresses of the members of such organiza-
tion and of persons who actively participate in the activities of such organization;
and
(2) accurate records and accounts of moneys received and expended (including
the sources from which received and the purposes for which expended) by such or-
ganization.
(g) It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to send' to each individual listed in
any registration statement or annual report, filed under this section, as a member of the
organization in respect of which such registration statement or annual report was filed, a
notification in writing that such individual is so listed; and such notification shall be
sent at the earliest practicable time after the filing of such registration statement or
annual report.
(h) In the case of failure on the part of any organization to register or to file any
registration statement or annual report as required by this section, it shall be the duty
of the executive officer (or individual performing the ordinary and usual duties of an
executive officer) and of the secretary (or individual performing the ordinary and usual
duties of a secretary) of such organization, and of such officer or officers of such or-
ganization as the Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe, to register for such
organization, to file such registration statement, or to file such annual report, as the case
may be.
§ 0. KEEPING Oi REGISTER: PUBLIC INSPECTION: REPORTS TO PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS.
§ 10. MEMBERSHIP IN CERTAIN COMMUNIST POITICAL ORGANIZATIONS. It shall be
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unlawful for any individual to become or remain a member of a communist political or-
ganization, knowing or believing, or having reasonable grounds for knowing or believing,
that it is a communist political organization, if (1) such organization is not registered pur-
suant to section 8, and (2) the period of time designated in section 8 for registration by
such organization has expired.§ 11. USE OF THE MAILS AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN CoMaECE.
It shall be unlawful for any organization which is registered under section 8, or for any
organization with respect to which there is in effect a final order of the Attorney General
requiring it to register under section 8, or for any person acting for or on behalf of such
organization-
(1) to transmit or cause to be transmitted, through the United States mails or by
any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce, any publication
which is intended to be, or which it is reasonable to believe is intended to be, circu-
lated or disseminated among two or more persons, unless such publication and any
envelope, wrapper, or other container in which it is mailed or otherwise circulated
or transmitted bears the following, printed in such manner as may be provided in
regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, with the name of the organization
appearing in lieu of the blank: "Disseminated by , a communist or-
ganization"; or
(2) to broadcast or cause to be broadcast any matter over any radio station in
the United States, unless such matter is preceded by the following statement, with the
name of the organization being stated in place of the blank: "The following program is
sponsored by , a communist organization."
§ 12. DENIAL or TAX DEDUCTIONS AND EXEMPTON. (a) Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, no deduction for Federal income tax purposes shall be allowed in ihe case
of a contribution to or for the use of any organization if at the time of the making of
such contribution (1) such organization is registered under section 8, or (2) there is in
effect a final order of the Attorney General requiring such organization to register under
section 8.
(b) No organization shall be entitled to exemption from Federal income tax, under sec-
tion 101 of the Internal Revenue Code, for any taxable year if at any time during such
taxable year (1) such organization is registered under section 8, or (2) there is in effect
a final order of the Attorney General requiring such organization to register under
section 8.
§ 13. CERTAIN ADmmnIsTRAzE DzrrwP.NArroNs. [Procedure to be followed by the
Attorney General in investigating and determining whether an organization is in fact a
communist political organization or a communist-front organization.]
§ 14. JUDICIA. REv Ew. [Procedure for obtaining court review of the Attorney General's
determination that an organization is a communist political organization or a communist-
front organization.]
§ 15. PENALTIES. (a) Any person failing to register or to file any registration statement or
annual report as required by section 8 of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be pun-
ished by a fine of not less than $2,000 and not more than $5,000; except that in case
such failure is on the part of the executive officer (or individual performing the ordinary
and usual duties of an executive officer) or secretary (or individual performing the ordi-
nary and usual duties of a secretary), or any other officer, of an organization required
to register under such section 8, the punishment for such failure shall be a fine of not less
than $2,000 and not more than $5,000, or imprisonment for not less than two years and
not more than five years, or both such fine and imprisonment. For the purposes of this
subsection, if there is in effect with respect to an organization a final order of the Attorney
General requiring it to register under section 8, each day of failure to register, whether
on the part of the organization or any individual, shall constitute a separate offense.
(b) Whoever, in a registration statement or annual report filed under section 8 of this
Act, willfully makes any false statement or willfully omits to state any fact which is re-
quired to be stated, or which is necessary to make the statements made or information
given not misleading, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not less than
$2,000 and not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not less than two years and
not more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(c) Any person violating any provision of this Act for violation of which no penalty
is provided by section 4 or by subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more
than two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
§ 16. SEPARAsmrTY Or PRovisioNs. If any provision of this Act, or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this
Act, or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be
affected thereby.
